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Abstract
Intense political debate surrounded the Italian university sys-
tem in the last ten years. The latter was widely perceived
as auto-referential and inefficient so that each government
proposed its own solutions and reforms. These targeted the
number of classes offered, the way professors are recruited
as well as parameters and amount of public funding toward
universities. The present dissertation investigates how inter-
ventions affected Italian professors. The first work look at
recruitment through the lens of game theory and represent
the selection process as a bargain between members of the
evaluation committee over the possible candidates. We bring
the model to the data and evaluate how the reform of selec-
tion rules affected some of the parameters of the model. The
second essay, focus on the funding system and in particular
on the norms that limit personnel expenses of universities.
We exploit the variation of budget constraints in time and
across institutions in a quasi-experimental framework and es-
timate the effect of staff turn over limits on the probability of
voluntary leaving academia. Finally, the last work looks di-
rectly into the political process and studies the formation and
break of coalitions in the Italian parliament through concepts
of complex network literature.
Chapter 2
A common observation is that individuals strive to neutral-
ize the effect of procedural rules designed to drive choices
away from their private optimum. An example of this phe-
nomenon is offered by the reaction of Italian academia to two
reforms that modified the procedures of recruitment and pro-
motion, by introducing random selection of the examiners
not appointed by the recruiting school and reducing from two
to one the number of candidates to be qualified. We model
the negotiation occurring within evaluation committees and
test the decision rule implied by the theoretical model on the
sample composed of all selections to associate and full pro-
fessorship initiated by the Italian schools of economics be-
tween 2004 and 2011. Particularly, we investigate whether
these reforms decreased the relative weight of the examiner
appointed by the recruiting school on committee’s decision.
Empirical results suggest that both reforms had little if no ef-
fect on examiners’ weights.
Chapter 3
The number of professors employed in Italian universities
dropped by 15% between 2008 and 2013. This resulted from
two opposite trends: a reduction in new hires and an incre-
ment in professors leaving academia. While the first trend
can be easily explained by government limits on personnel
expenses the second one deserves further explanations. In
this paper we investigate whether budget constrains on per-
sonnel expenses backfired by pushing Italian professor to quit
their positions for private companies or foreign institutions.
We exploit the selectivity of the new regulation along with
its time variation in a quasi-experimental framework. Re-
sults indicate an increase in voluntary leaves among institu-
tions with more severe staff limitations. Surprisingly the lat-
ter show lower voluntary leaves on average in both pre and
post reform periods. We provide some explanations for these
results and point out the limits of our methodologies for fu-
ture investigations.
Chapter 4
We analyze the network of relations between parliament mem-
bers according to their voting behavior. In particular, we ex-
amine the emergent community structure with respect to po-
litical coalitions and government alliances. We rely on tools
developed in the Complex Network literature to explore the
core of these communities and use their topological features
to develop new metrics for party polarization, internal coali-
tion cohesiveness and government strength. As a case study,
we focus on the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parlia-
ment, for which we are able to characterize the heterogene-
ity of the ruling coalition as well as parties specific contribu-
tions to the stability of the government over time. We find
sharp contrast in the political debate which surprisingly does
not imply a relevant structure based on establised parties.
We take a closer look to changes in the community struc-
ture after parties split up and their effect on the position of
single deputies within communities. Finally, we introduce a
way to track the stability of the government coalition over
time that is able to discern the contribution of each member
along with the impact of its possible defection. While our case
study relies on the Italian parliament, whose relevance has
come into the international spotlight in the present economic
downturn, the methods developed here are entirely general
and can therefore be applied to a multitude of other scenar-
ios.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Education plays a fundamental role for the economic well being of in-
dividuals and society. Micro evidence suggests education is critical in
modern labour markets with schooling being positively related to higher
wages and lower unemployment (Cohn and Addison, 1998; Card, 1999).
On a macro level, education seems to benefit societies through positive
externalities such as technological progress (Lucas, 1988), reduction in
crime rates (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) or more active voters (Wantchekon
et al., 2015). This explains the high share of education in states expendi-
ture (OECD, 2014) as well as the intense political debate that surrounds
the education system. Part of this debate is mirrored in the empirical
literature where features of the educational system, their evolution and
economic impact is evaluated over time. Brunello and Checchi (2007) for
example investigate the impact of early tracking of schools on human
capital accumulation; Battistin and Schizzerotto (2012) and De Paola and
Scoppa (2014) analyse the effect of grade retention on student achieve-
ments and Checchi (1999) and Bagues (2012) analyse the determinants of
promotions to academic chairs. The first two works in the present disser-
tation relate to this stream of literature and in particular to the program
evaluation of educational reforms. We exploit two exogenous shifts in
regulation to assess their effects on the selection of professors in Italian
academia. We look at two types of selection: the positive selection re-
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lated to the recruitment process and the negative one related to outflows
of Italian researchers.
In the first one, we look at the main features of the recruitment system
to associate and full professors through the lens of game theory. We
build up a simple bargain model and empirically estimate its parame-
ters. Unlike Checchi et al. (2014) our players are commissioners who
negotiate over candidates. Once the rules underpinning the selection of
commissioners change according to an exogenous shift in regulation we
are able to partially identify their bargaining power and possibly con-
clude on whether the political goals of the reform were achieved or not.
Although our focus differs from civic capital, our findings are similar in
spirit to Putnam et al. (1994) and Durante et al. (2011) in that the reg-
ulatory framework may have unexpected outcomes depending on the
incentives in place. In our case, we show how repeated interaction and
the payoffs at stake play against the ultimate objectives of policy makers
as we are able to structurally estimate some of the parameters of the the-
oretical model.
In the second work, we move from inflows to outflows of researchers
occurred in conjunction with the economic downturn. In the aftermath
of the economic crisis many OECD member countries saw fiscal deficits
soaring due to stimulus packages, reduction in revenues and in some
cases banking assistance packages (OECD, 2011). Fiscal deficits rose to
7.9% of GDP and many countries, faced with interest rate hikes on sove-
reign bonds, implemented fiscal consolidation plans. Italy adjusted fis-
cal imbalances mainly through tax increases and reduction of retirement
benefits but, nevertheless, the adjustment impacted also the education
sector. Indeed, on the expenditure side many norms targeted public em-
ployees and professors in particular, with limits to the amount of staff
turn over in public universities. The latter were divided in two types
depending on a threshold on the incidence of personnel expenses: uni-
versities below the limit could hire only up to 50% of the savings from re-
tired personnel while universities above that were completely prevented
from hiring new professors. Not surprisingly, the norm induced a reduc-
tion in new hires and promotions that brought the number of professors
employed in Italian universities down by 15% between 2008 and 2013.
Besides the block on entries, the decline resulted also from an increas-
ing number of professors leaving academia. In this paper we investigate
whether budget constrains on personnel expenses backfired by inducing
Italian professor to quit their positions for private companies or foreign
institutions. We argue that a prolonged alt in promotions may have af-
fected careers outlooks and may have reduced expected earnings of Ital-
ian professors. Differentials in labour incomes are indeed regarded as
the most important economic determinants of migration (Sjaastad, 1962,
Borjas, 1991). Besides expected earnings, whether individuals decide to
quit their positions depends, among others, on the size of outside op-
portunities. With this respect, Italian researchers were not the only one
dealing with reduced funding. Similar concerns rose, for example, in
the US during the negotiation between democrats and republicans over
debt-ceiling deals (Gulledge, 2011). Yet in Italy these budget constraints
were planned on multiple years (in fact they are still in place) and they
were relatively easy to predict resulting possibly in greater impact on ex-
pectations. Empirical work on the link between economic crisis, public
universities funding and potential outflows of researchers is surprisingly
scarce. To fill this gap, we exploit the selectivity of the new regulation
along with its time variation in a quasi-experimental framework. Prelim-
inary results indicate an increase in voluntary leaves among institutions
with more severe staff limitations. Surprisingly the latter show lower
voluntary leaves on average in both pre and post reform periods. We
provide some explanations for these results and point out the limits of
our methodologies for future investigations.
Finally, the last essay looks directly into the political process and studies
the formation and break of coalitions in the Italian parliament through
concepts of complex network literature. This approach is well estab-
lished for the US Congress with a network representation being given
to committees and subcommittees that share the same members (Porter
et al., 2005), to members of the Congress who co-sponsor bills (Fowler,
2006; Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010) or those who place the same roll-call
votes (Waugh et al., 2009a). Similarly to Zhang et al. (2008) and Waugh
et al. (2009b) we make use of the network science concept of modularity
in order to reconstruct the community structure of the parliament while
being agnostic about political ties. We introduce a novel method to char-
acterize the position of each deputy in the community of reference, based
on its contribution to the modularity score, proposing a more intuitive
interpretation compared to that based on the spectral decomposition de-
veloped in Waugh et al. (2009b) and in Porter et al. (2005). In this way we
are able to characterize the heterogeneity of the ruling coalition as well
as parties specific contributions to the stability of the government over
time. We find sharp contrast in the political debate which surprisingly
does not imply a relevant structure based on establised parties. We take
a closer look to changes in the community structure after parties split up
and their effect on the position of single deputies within communities
by exploiting the events leading to the formation of the first Renzi gov-
ernment. While our case study relies on the Italian parliament, whose
relevance has come into the international spotlight in the present eco-
nomic downturn, the methods developed here are entirely general and
can therefore be applied to a multitude of other scenarios.
Chapter 2
Procedures vs. incentives:
the case of the university
promotion system in Italy
2.1 Introduction
When a formal procedure is introduced to constrain individual behavior,
a strategic reaction should be expected. Often, people struggle to com-
plying with the procedure without being forced to change their optimal
choice, in so doing bypassing the spirit and the purpose of the norm.
An example of this phenomenon is provided by two reforms of re-
cruitment and promotion of professors in Italian academia. The first re-
form, enacted in 2008, introduced the principle of randomization in the
composition of the local evaluation committees. Before, one member of
the committee was appointed by the school calling for the position and
four members were professors elected by all peers nationwide. After the
reform the four external examiners were randomly drawn from a list of
peers. The second reform, introduced in 2005, suspended in 2008 and
soon restored, reduced from two to one the number of candidates to be
qualified in each local selection (called concorso). In both cases the de-
clared purpose was that of enhancing the independence of the external
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examiners, reducing collusion within each committee and by that way
making recruitment and promotion more meritocratic.
In this paper we evaluate the effect of such reforms. We first propose a
model of candidates’ qualification from which we derive the committee’s
optimal decision rule. The latter has a simple empirical counterpart that
we estimate on all concorsi held in Italy between 2004 and 2011 and called
by the schools of economics. Particularly, we estimate the relative weight
of the internal examiner on committee decisions.
Our results suggest that both reforms did not significantly altered the
preeminent role of the internal examiner on recruitment and promotion
decisions, supporting the claim that Italian academia was able to neutral-
ize the effect of the new procedures and continue its business as usual.
This result is not surprising given that the reforms modified only
procedural aspects of recruitment but did not alter the fundamental in-
centives of academia and academics. Indeed, both reforms were intro-
duced in a context of low-powered incentives, where funds were equally
distributed among universities, professors salary depended on seniority
only, while high quality teaching or strong scientific productivity played
no role. Professors directly managed their institutions and their power
and rents depended on colleagues’ consensus. Hence, rather than be-
ing considered a resource, the most productive candidates in the concorsi
were perceived as a threat, as they could have altered the status quo in the
schools. Quite the opposite, the preferred candidates were those offering
enough guarantees regarding their willingness to preserve and support
the status quo.
Our analysis is related with Perotti (2002) and Durante et al. (2011).
They look at the selections held in Italy immediately after the decentral-
ization of recruitment occurred in 1998. Perotti (2002) concludes that de-
centralization did not achieve a higher degree of meritocracy compared
to the previous system. Being a candidate affiliated or well connected to
the recruiting school had a dominant influence on the probability of be-
ing qualified and appointed, especially when the scientific productivity
of the evaluation committee was below the median. Interestingly, Perotti
(2002) analyzes the determinants of the number of votes that external
examiners received and finds no relation with their scientific record. Du-
rante et al. (2011) study familism/nepotism in academic promotions by
looking at the pattern of family names in the recruiting university and
among the candidates. They find a strong association between civic cap-
ital measured at the province level and nepotism and argue that while
decentralization increased the possibility to behave opportunistically ev-
erywhere, misconduct increased mainly in the areas poor of civic capital.
A recent contribution by De Paola et al. (2011) exploits the random com-
position of the evaluation committees (the same reform we analyze in
this paper) to establish whether promotions are affected by gender bias.
They follow the same approach adopted by Bagues and Esteve-Volart
(2010) that investigate gender bias in national public exams to access
four main corps of the Spanish Judiciary over 1987-2005, Zinovyeva and
Bagues (2011) that estimate gender bias in academic promotions in Spain,
and in Bagues (2012) that study the role of connections compared to pro-
ductivity. Also Combes et al. (2008), by using the French data of the agr-
gation nationale between 1984 and 2003, assess the relative importance of
scientific production compared to professional links between candidates
and evaluators.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates some features
of the institutional background, Section 3 discusses the dataset and Sec-
tion 4 introduces the model. Section 5 presents the empirical implemen-
tation. Results are reported in Section 6. Possible alternative explana-
tions of our findings are discussed in Section 7. Conclusions and techni-
cal appendices follow.
2.2 Institutional Background
Italian concorsi have been widely criticized for not selecting the best can-
didates, reflecting the scarce attention of academia to meritocracy. The
features of the public university funding prevailing between 1999 and
2010 help understanding what incentives universities, schools and aca-
demics faced in that period. There were neither a nationwide evaluation
of university productivity or a firmly established link between funding
and performance. Before 2009 universities were assigned government
funds - the so called Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario (FFO) - on a com-
pletely egalitarian basis, regardless of their performance in research and
teaching. Salaries increased each other year for everyone by the same
proportion and career progression depended very little on publications
and productivity (Perotti, 2002). Professors were subject to very few obli-
gations regarding teaching and research. Overall, university provided
decent rents to academics, in terms of a prestigious social position, a
good salary, the possibility of carrying on external professional activi-
ties.1
There is some consensus - even if based only on anecdotal evidence
- that Italian academy was quite successful in preserving and maximiz-
ing its rent, an achievement generally incompatible with a meritocratic
recruitment.2 The decentralized promotion system introduced in 1998,
by which a school with a vacancy was allowed to call a concorso, of-
fered schools the possibility of recruiting the candidates fitting better
with their needs and, by enlarging the opportunities of collusion, fa-
vored the purpose of maintaining the status quo. Academics affiliated to
different schools jointly determined the outcome of several concorsi, by
mutually agreeing on the principle that each school had the indisputable
right of deciding who was to be hired, regardless of any consideration of
candidate’s scientific merits. As discussed by Perotti (2002) also examin-
ers with good scientific records that participate to evaluation committees
often accepted this principle, because they knew that any deviation from
the collusive equilibrium could have been punished in the future concorsi
that their own schools would have opened.
1Nevertheless, the absence of a link between productivity and remuneration or career
progression does not imply that the generality of Italian professors were inactive, nor that
they did not care about their publication record. It means only that good research was not
promoted by the university system and that it ultimately rested on the intrinsic motivation
and good will of individuals and schools.The situation might improve in the next future.
In 2011 the national agency of evaluation (ANVUR) became fully operational and the first
nationwide assessment of research production (VQR 2004-2010) terminated in 2014. Since
2009 a small share of the FFO has been linked to some productivity indicators (this share
was 7 percent of total funding in 2009 and increased up to 15 percent in 2013).
2Indeed, recruiting highly productive scholars, more interested in scientific achieve-
ments than on rents, would likely alter the status quo.
Collusion was also favored by the rules governing concorsi. Candi-
dates were evaluated by a committee made up of five professors: one
member of the committee was appointed by the recruiting school (inter-
nal examiner) and the other four came from different universities (ex-
ternal examiners). The evaluation committee selected a fixed number of
candidates to be qualified (called idonei) and the recruiting school had the
option, but not the obligation, of appointing one idoneo of its choice. The
appointed idoneo was the winner of the concorso. The remaining idonei
could be appointed by any other university, including those the external
examiners came from, within two or three years. Between 1999 and 2008
external examiners were elected by the whole national body of full pro-
fessors in the same scientific field, a procedure that allowed the election
of external examiners to be “managed” in order to obtain committees ac-
commodating the will of the recruiting school ?). Between 1999 and 2001
three candidates in each concorso could be qualified. Between 2002 and
2005, this number decreased to two (the double qualification system). Hav-
ing more than one qualification left room for extensive “horse-trading”
between internal and external examiners and between schools. The inter-
nal examiner could more easily obtain the qualification of his preferred
candidate by promising of voting for the preferred candidate of an exter-
nal examiner for the second idoneita`.
This system underwent two reforms. The first regarded the composi-
tion of evaluation committees. Since 2007, external examiners were ran-
domly selected from a (long enough) list of professors. The purpose of
the reform was that of making more difficult to manipulate the composi-
tion of the evaluation committee and of increasing the independence of
the external examiners, by this way reducing the weight of the internal
examiner and the recruiting school on the final decision. The second re-
form regarded the number of idonei in each concorso. Since 2005 only one
candidate could qualify for each position (the single qualification system).
This decision lasted little and two qualifications were re-introduced in
2007. Eventually, following public condemnation, the single qualifica-
tion system was re-established in 2008. Figure 1 depicts this dynamic.3
3Since 2012 a new centralized recruitment system has been introduced and the first pro-
Figure 1: Single and double qualifications overtime
N. qualifications
1
2
20092005 20082003 2004 2006 2007
These reforms modified two formal rules of the concorsi with the pur-
pose of inducing committees to select better deserving candidates even if
in contrast with the desires of the recruiting school. In fact, these reforms
contradicted the logic of the decentralized system and recognized that
schools had little incentive to hire and promote on a meritocratic basis.
However, hardly are downstream interventions effective if not accompa-
nied with more radical reforms able to modify fundamental incentives.
Indeed, if schools agreed - even implicitly - on the principle that each of
them is free to decide who is to be hired, then neither the way external
examiners are selected, nor the number of idonei would matter for the
final outcome of a concorso.
2.3 Theoretical model
We model the selection procedure as a negotiation between internal and
external examiners. The model presented in this section refers to the
case of double qualification. The single qualification setting may be in-
terpreted as a special case and will be discussed in Appendix B.
Suppose that a continuum of aspirant professors apply to a concorso.
Define the quality of each candidate as the set of his relevant characteris-
tics and let it be summarized by a uni-dimensional measure, denoted h,
with h > 0. Each candidate has a particular value of h.
Evaluation committees receive and examine candidates curricula and
eventually decide who are the idonei. To simplify the analysis we assume
that the committee is composed by one internal examiner and only one
motions and recruitment based on the new system have taken place in 2014.
external examiner.4 We also assume that the internal examiner shares the
same preferences of the recruiting school, so that any agency problem can
be set aside.
Internal and external examiners negotiate over which applicants should
qualify. Next the internal examiner, on behalf of the recruiting school, de-
cides whether to appoint and what candidate to appoint.5
Each party conceives an ideal candidate and weights each applicant
according to the distance from such ideal. Each party’s ideal is a candi-
date that perfectly reflects party’s characteristics, i.e. with a h score equal
to party’s h. By this characterization we capture the preference for pre-
serving the status quo that was prevalent in the Italian university in those
years.6
We formalize the negotiation between internal and external examin-
ers and the subsequent decision of the internal examiner as a modified
“collective model” (see Chiappori, 1988)7 with a guarantee of minimum
payoff to the internal examiner. Thus, committee preferences are de-
scribed by a weighted average of its members payoffs. In this welfare
function the “Pareto weights” reflect the relative bargaining power of
the two parties or their relative influence on the committee decision. The
guarantee of minimum payoff accounts in a simple way for the option
that the internal examiner has to refuse of appointing one of the idonei if
they are both too far from his ideal. Upon refusal he receives a minimum
4The latter assumption implies that the preferences of the external examiners can be
summarized by those of a representative agent.
5This formalization is consistent with empirical data: typically committees seek an
agreement among all examiners or at least of four out of five. Both anecdotal and empirical
evidence exclude that the final decision in a concorso could be obtained by means of major-
ity voting or other procedures that do not involve communication, coordination, mediation
and compromise among examiners. Partly the search for an agreement is sponsored by the
rules governing the recruitment procedures (e.g. most evaluation criteria are stated by the
law and additional criteria need to be approved by the committee and bind all examiners
evaluation), partly unanimity serves to discourage future plaints by the non qualified can-
didates and partly unanimity is the result of collusion and the mutual agreement on the
principle of “right-to-decide” of each recruiting school.
6A school with an open vacancy that calls for selection procedure wants to preserve
and reproduce its average quality, a strategy which guarantees the stability of the existing
internal equilibria.
7The collective model is commonly used to represent the choice of a household com-
posed of several members with different preferences.
payoff equal to the option value, exogenously fixed, of organizing an-
other selection in the future and recruiting someone else possibly closer
to his preferences. No such guarantee protects the external examiner.
The inclusion of this device in the model serves to account for the rel-
evant proportion of concorsi that end up with no appointment between
2004 and 2011, as we shall illustrate in the next section.
Formally, examiners utility function is defined as
Ui = −α(hi − h1)2 − (1− α)(hi − h2)2 (2.1)
Ue = −β(he − h1)2 − (1− β)(he − h2)2
where subscript i and e identifies internal and external examiners respec-
tively, U is the utility function, h1 and h2 are the qualities of the two qual-
ified candidates, hi and he are the qualities of the examiners and, finally,
α and β are preference parameters over candidates of the internal and
external examiners, respectively. We assume α > 12 so that idoneo 1 will
weight more than idoneo 2 in the internal examiner utility function. Thus,
at equilibrium idoneo 1 will be closer than idoneo 2 to the internal exam-
iner ideal, and, in case of recruitment, he will be the chosen candidate
(i.e. the winner).
Once two idonei have been identified, the internal examiner will ap-
point idoneo 1 if the utility Ui he derives from the selection procedure
exceeds his minimum payoff U¯i. Otherwise, no one will be appointed
and the concorso concludes with a failure. From the external examiner’s
viewpoint failure has pros and cons. On the pros side, in a failure, the ex-
ternal examiner obtains two idonei relatively close to his bliss point. On
the cons side, although the two idonei may be appointed by other schools
within two or three years, appointment is not guaranteed and it will cer-
tainly take time. Moreover the external examiner will be held responsible
for the waste of resources suffered by the recruiting school and he will
be at risk of being sanctioned in future selections procedures. We assume
that the cost of a failure to the external examiner is exogenous and equal
to δ.
Formally, the problem that internal and external examiners face is
that of maximizing
W =
{
γUi + (1− γ)Uc if Ui ≥ −U¯i
γU¯i + (1− γ)(Uc − δ) if Ui < −U¯i (2.2)
with respect to h1 and h2, where γ is the “Pareto weight” of the internal
examiner. The first line corresponds to the appointment regime, where
idoneo 1 will be eventually recruited, and the second to the failure regime,
where two candidates are qualified but no one will be recruited.
Being the problem discontinuous, the two regimes have to be an-
alyzed separately. Formally each regime involves a constrained maxi-
mization in its own. In Appendix A we show that, if δ is small enough,
the solutions of problem (2.2) is either the unconstrained solution of the
appointment regime or the unconstrained solution of the failure regime,
depending on the values of the parameters8.
Precisely, the optimum of (2.2), which represents the decision rule of
the committee, is

h∗1 =
αγ
K
hi +
β(1− γ)
K
he
h∗2 =
(1− α)γ
1−K hi +
(1− β)(1− γ)
1−K he
if (hi − he)2 6 ∆
and{
h∗1 = he
h∗2 = he
if (hi − he)2 > ∆
where K = αγ + β(1− γ) and ∆ is a complex function of the parameters
(α, β, γ, δ, U¯i) defined in Appendix A.
Indeed, if the distance between the internal and external examiner’s
bliss points is not too large, the solution of the negotiation will satisfy
the internal examiner and the appointment of idoneo 1 will conclude the
procedure. In this case both idonei have characteristics located between
8In other words the optimum of the problem never occurs at the discontinuity frontier
of the objective function W .
the bliss points of the two examiners and they will be closer to the inter-
nal examiner bliss point the higher his weight (for any fixed preference
parameters α and β). Instead, when such distance exceeds a well defined
threshold, the outcome of the concorso will be a failure, no candidate will
be appointed, but the two idonei h score will coincide with the bliss point
of the external examiner.
Quite similarly, in the single-qualification case we have
h∗1 = γhi + (1− γ)he if (hi − he)2 6 Θ (2.3)
and
h∗1 = he if (hi − he)2 > Θ (2.4)
where Θ is a function of the parameters (γ, δ, U¯i). We refer to Appendix
B for a formal derivation of the single-qualification case.
2.4 Data
Our data include all concorsi to associate and full professorship called
by Italian schools of economics (facolt di economia) and concluded be-
tween 2004 and 2011. We have discarded all competitions in non-core
scientific areas (foreign languages, informatics, sociology) and focused
on economics, management, law and quantitative disciplines (stats and
maths). In Table 1 we report the number of concorsi by year of the call,
distinguishing between concorsi with elected committees (Pre-reform) and
with randomly selected committees (Post-reform) and between concorsi
with one or two qualifications.9
Quite surprisingly, more than 10 percent of all concorsi ended up with-
out winners, i.e. the recruiting school eventually decided not to appoint
any qualified candidate. We refer to these cases as failures (see Table 2).
We have investigated what justification was provided by the recruiting
schools in case of failure: in most cases the reason for non appointing
9Note that in 2007 there are no calls. This happened because the introduction of new
rules forced the Minister to postpone all outstanding competitions. The procedures for the
concorsi called for in 2008 where suspended for almost two years and they ended up in 2010
and 2011.
Table 1: Concorsi by year of the call
Pre-reform Post-reform
Single Double Single Double Total
2004 . 126 . . 126
2005 24 115 . . 139
2006 46 . . . 46
2007 . . . . .
2008 . . 1 148 149
2009 . . 12 20 32
Total 70 241 13 168 492
was a major misalignment between idonei’s characteristics and the char-
acteristics of the position the school posted in the call.10
Table 2: Failures by type of concorso
Pre-reform Post-reform Total
Double: Appointment 219 143 362
Double: Failure 22 25 47
Single: Appointment 56 10 66
Single: Failure 14 3 17
Total 311 181 492
Data include biographical information of all examiners and qualified
candidates, the names of the idonei and of the winner (if any) for each
competition, the dates of the call and of the end of the procedure. We
do not have information on candidates who apply for the position but
eventually did not qualify.
Perhaps the most critical choice in this study is how to measure can-
didates’ and examiners’ quality. To be fully consistent with the model we
should consider an index that combines scientific productivity, teaching
quality and all other characteristics that might be relevant in a selection
procedure. Being data on all these dimensions unavailable - if not unob-
10There are two cases where faculty motivated the decision with budget problems or
a major reorganization of teachings underway. We have excluded these cases from our
dataset.
servable altogether - we focus on scientific productivity assuming that it
is an unbiased predictor of candidates’ and examiners’ overall quality.
Scientific productivity is the only dimension that is measurable for all
subjects involved in our analysis in an objective manner. We adopt the h
index proposed by Hirsch, an index which takes into account both quan-
tity and impact of each scholar scientific production. For instance, an
h-index equal to n indicates that a researcher has published at least n pa-
pers cited by at least n other publications belonging to the same dataset.
By construction, the index is robust to cases of scholars with few but
highly cited papers as well as of authors with lot of papers with only a
modest impact on the scientific community.
We have collected the h-index of all qualified candidates, examin-
ers and the entire faculty of the recruiting school, from the “Publish or
Perish” software (Harzing, Harzing) which exploits the Google Scholar
database of publications and citations. Eventually, we have collected the
h-index of candidates, examiners and faculty members for almost 500
concorsi between 2004 and 2011 making up a database of about 36000 en-
tries.11 The choice of measuring scientific productivity over the Google
Scholar data, which includes not only published articles and books but
also gray publication such as working papers and reports, depends on
the fact that we need information for quite different scientific areas (e.g.
law v.s. economics) with quite different publication traditions. Further-
more, Google Scholar is the most comprehensive search engine for social
sciences (Harzing and der Wai, 2008).
We use as an unbiased predictor of h1 and h2, candidates qualities,
their own h-index as of the date of the call, he by the average h-index
of the four external examiners in each evaluation committee and hi by
the average h-index of the faculty of the recruiting school in the same
field of the position to be awarded. This way we make operational our
assumption that the internal examiner acts on behalf of his school and
completely shares his school’s preferences.
In Tables 3 and 4 we report summary statistics of the h-index of candi-
11The h-index is based exclusively on the publications appeared on Google Scholar be-
fore the date of call of each concorso
dates and examiners distinguishing between double and single qualifica-
tion, by outcome of the concorso (failure or appointment), and by method
of committee selection (elected, randomized)12.
12The sample of concorsi that we consider coincides with that used in the empirical anal-
ysis. Compared to the full sample of concorsi reported in Table 1, 27 concorsi are missing for
lack of some relevant information.
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Descriptives based on the “Pooled Sample” (right-hand panel) imme-
diately reveal that the concorsi ending up with a failure are those where
the difference between the internal and the external examiners’ h-index
is relatively large, consistently with the predictions of our model. Figure
2 depicts the cumulative distribution of the absolute value of (hi−he) by
type of outcome (after controlling for a full set of dummies for scientific
field, year of the concorso, geographical area of the school, level of the con-
corso). In accordance with the implications of the theoretical model the
(absolute) difference in quality between internal and external examiners
is larger when a failure occurs.
Another interesting evidence emerging from the double-qualification
case is that the median h-index of both idonei is in between hi and he in
case of appointment and close to the external examiner bliss point in case
of failure. Qualitatively similar results holds for concorsi with a single
qualification, although in the appointment case median h-index of the
unique idoneo is outside the interval [hi, he].
Comparing the pre-reform (elected committees) and the post-reform
(randomized committees) samples, we note that the h-index of post-
reform candidates and examiners are moderately larger and more dis-
persed. Unexpectedly however, not only the variance between-concorsi
of external examiners’ h-index increased little after the reform (as the IQR
values of Tables 3 and 4 indicate), but also the variance within-concorsi re-
mained remarkably stable, suggesting that, overall, randomization had
a relatively small impact on external examiners, at least as regards their
h-index.13 Actually, the more pronounced differences regarded internal
examiners, i.e. the the members chosen by the recruiting schools, who
were not directly influenced by the reform.
13The average standard deviation rose from 2.56 to 2,86 in the double qualification case
and from 2.56 to 3.30 in the single qualification case.
Figure 2: Distribution of (Hi − He) net of observable characteristics of the
concorso
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2.5 Empirical Implementation.
After rewriting the decision rule of the committee as
h∗1 − he =
{
αγ
K (hi − he) if (hi − he)2 ≤ ∆
0 if (hi − he)2 > ∆ (2.5)
h∗2 − he =
{
(1−α)γ
1−K (hi − he) if (hi − he)2 ≤ ∆
0 if (h− he)2 > ∆
(2.6)
the key implication of the model becomes apparent: the distance be-
tween internal and external examiners (hi − he) determines both the
discrete outcome (agreement vs. failure) and the continuous outcome (the
quality for the qualified candidates).
To take to the data the equation for the decision rule we set
hi − he = (Hi −He) +Xθ + ε (2.7)
h∗1 − he = (H1 −He) +Xθ + ε (2.8)
h∗2 − he = (H2 −He) +Xθ + ε (2.9)
whereH is for Hirsch h-index. The componentXθ+ε (X observable and
ε unobservable) is a concorso-specific prediction error of the unobserved
quality of candidates and examiners. Since this component is concorso-
specific we impose the restriction that θ is common across equations (9)-
(11). Furthermore, ε is a random variable with zero-mean and standard
deviation σ accounting for unobservable characteristics of each concorso
that we assume to be orthogonal to (Hi−He) , (H1 −He) and (H2 −He)
conditional to X .14
Replacing equations (2.7)-(2.9) into equations (2.5) and (2.6) yields the
empirical counterparts of the optimal decision rules in the case of agree-
ment:
H1 −He = αγ
K
(Hi −He) +
(αγ
K
− 1
)
Xθ +
(αγ
K
− 1
)
ε (2.10)
14Note that rewriting the model in terms of deviations from he implicitly imposes the
constraint that the coefficients of hi and he sum up to 1.
and
H2 −He = (1− α)γ
1−K (Hi −He) +
(
(1− α)γ
1−K − 1
)
Xθ+
+
(
(1− α)γ
1−K − 1
)
ε
(2.11)
Agreement occurs when−√∆ 6 (Hi−He)+Xθ+ε 6
√
∆ and failure
when (Hi −He) +Xθ + ε < −
√
∆ or (Hi −He) +Xθ + ε >
√
∆.
Observable concorso characteristics include a dummy variable equal to
one if the concorso is to appoint a full professor and equal to zero if it is
to appoint an associate professor; dummies for the scientific field of the
competition; dummies of geographic area (to capture the characteristics
of the schools calling the selection); and year dummies. The inclusion
of scientific field and geographic dummies captures fundamental differ-
ences among scientific fields in their propensity to publish and among
schools as regards the criteria they adopt to appoint new scholars. To
reduce the dimensionality of the regression problem we replace X in
our equations with a bivariate Generalized Propensity Score including
the estimated conditional expectation, GPS1(X), and conditional vari-
ance, GPS2(X), of (Hi −He) on the control variables in X (see Imbens,
2000). The key mathematical property of the GPS is that if conditioning
on the whole set of control variables warrants the identification of the
causal parameter of interest, then conditioning on the GPS based on the
very same set of control variables warrants identification as well.
The effect of the reform is captured by including an interaction be-
tween (Hi −He) and a dummy reform which takes one for concorsi with
a randomized committee.15 To simplify estimation, we impose from the
outset the restriction that the threshold ∆ relevant for the outcome fail-
ure/agreement is not affected by the reform. At first glance this might
seem inconsistent with the theoretical model, but in appendix C we sug-
gest this is indeed the case at least approximately.
15The crucial identifying restriction we are imposing here is that conditional on the con-
trol variables the Pareto weight would have been stable overtime in the absence of reforms.
Hence, the equations we estimate in case of agreement are:
H1 −He = pi11(Hi −He) + pi12(Hi −He)× reform+ (2.12)
+ (pi11 − 1) (θ0 + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X)) +
+ (pi11 − 1) ε
and
H2 −He = pi21(Hi −He) + pi22(Hi −He)× reform+ (2.13)
+ (pi21 − 1) (θ0 + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X))
+ (pi21 − 1) ε
where αγK = pi11 and
(1−α)γ
1−K = pi21 in the concorsi with elected committees
(reform=0) and αγK = pi11 + pi12 and
(1−α)γ
1−K = pi21 + pi22 in concorsi with
randomized committees (reform=1).
The key parameter is the Pareto weight of the internal examiner, γ,
before and after the reform that introduced randomization. Our strategy
identifies only αγK and
(1−α)γ
1−K both before and after the reform. Note
however that if αγK >
(1−α)γ
1−K , a condition directly testable against the
data, then α > K. This fact bears two important implications:
1) pi21 < γ < pi11 (and pi21 + pi22 < γ < pi11 + pi12 after the reform) i.e.
the estimated parameters pi21 (resp. pi21 + pi22) and pi11 (resp. pi11 + pi12)
are lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the parameter of interest
γ, since 1−α1−K γ < γ <
α
K γ.
2) α > β, i.e. the internal examiner weights more idoneo 1 compared
to the external examiner.
Although without further assumptions on preference parameters α
and β we can achieve only partial identification of γ, this will prove to
be enough to draw conclusions.
The case of single qualification is alike. The empirical equation to
estimate and the condition for agreement vs failure can be easily derived
from equations (2.3) and (2.4)
H1 −He = pis1(Hi −He) + pis2(Hi −He)× reform+ (2.14)
+ (pis1 − 1) (θ0 + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X)) +
+ (pis1 − 1) ε
where γ = pis1 in the concorsi with elected committees and γ = pis1 +
pis2 in the concorsi with randomized committees. Note that in the single-
qualification case exact identification of γ is obtained.
From now on consider only idoneo 1 - the cases for idoneo 2 and that
of single-qualification being very similar.
2.5.1 Estimation procedure
To estimate the parameters of the model we proceed in two steps. First
we estimate a modified Probit model for the probability to observe a con-
corso ending with an agreement. The standard Probit model is modified
to take into account that a failure might occur either because
hi − he = θ0 + (Hi −He) + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X) + ε < −
√
∆
or because
hi − he = θ0 + (Hi −He) + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X) + ε >
√
∆
The resulting likelihood function is:
Lt =
∏
{failure}
[
Φ
(
− 1
σ
(∆)1/2 − 1
σ
(Hi −He)
)
+ Φ
(
− 1
σ
(∆)1/2 +
1
σ
(Hi −He)
)]
×
(2.15)
×
∏
{agreement}
[
Φ
(
1
σ
(∆)1/2 − 1
σ
(Hi −He)
)
− Φ
(
− 1
σ
(∆)1/2 − 1
σ
(Hi −He)
)]
(for simplicity we omit from equation (17) the two components of the
GPS and the constant). Maximization of (2.15) yields an estimate for 1σ
and for 1σ (∆)
1/2.
Second we estimate equations (2.12) and (2.13) on the sub-sample of
concorsi ended with an agreement by means of a truncated regression
estimator. The adjustment to take into account truncation is derived in
Appendix D.16
Second step standard errors must be corrected to account for the use
of estimated values for 1σ and for
1
σ (∆)
1/2 that enter in the adjustment for
truncation. We implement the correction by running a Montecarlo simu-
lation. From the distribution of ε, assumed to be normal with zero-mean
and standard deviation equal to the value of σ estimated at the baseline,
we draw 500 random vectors, denoted εj for j = 1...500. For each j we
compute I∗j = θˆ0 + (Hi −He) + θˆ1GPS1(X) + θˆ2GPS2(X) + εj and we
generate a pseudo-outcome variable Yj which takes 0 if
(
I∗j
)2 6 ∆ˆ (pre-
dicted case of agreement) and 1 if
(
I∗j
)2
> ∆ˆ (predicted case of failure),
where θˆ0,θˆ1 ,θˆ2 and ∆ˆ are baseline estimates. Next, for any Yj we re-run
our two-stage procedure where the dependent variables of the second-
stage truncated regression (for both idoneo 1 and idoneo 2) are generated
combining baseline predicted values with εj . Both dependent and inde-
pendent variables include the correction for truncation which is derived
from first-stage estimates for each j. Thus, we produce 500 replications of
all parameter estimates that we use to derive parameter standard errors.
As a benchmark we also report standard OLS estimates of equations
(2.12) and (2.13) on the subsample of concorsi where agreement was ach-
ieved, neglecting the problem of truncation. This is because in this spe-
cific instance the bias induced by the upper truncation and the symmetric
bias induced by the lower truncation might cancel out.
2.6 Empirical results
Results of first and second stage are reported in Table 5 and 6, for the
case of double and single qualification respectively.17 As for the second
16Note that the coefficients of GPS1(X) and GPS2(X) in equations in (2.12) and (2.13)
are non linear functions of the coefficients of (Hi−He) and of the coefficients ofGPS1(X)
and GPS2(X) in the agreement equation, something we can test against the data.
17Note that in the first stage we do not impose the restriction that the censoring thresh-
olds are symmetric around zero, since the intercept of the equation is left unconstrained.
stage, we report estimates of pi11 , pi12 and pi21, pi22 respectively for idoneo
1 and idoneo 2, which are the bounds of γ, i.e. the Pareto weight of the
internal examiner before and after the reform. For the case of single qual-
ification we report the corresponding parameters pis1 and pis2. There is a
neat evidence that adjusting (two-step estimator) and not adjusting (OLS
estimator) for truncation plays a minor role: point estimates are similar,
although, as expected, OLS estimates are more precise. In the following
we comment on the OLS.
Under the hypothesis that 1) evaluation committees aim to reach unan-
imous decisions to discourage subsequent appeals, and 2) external exam-
iners perfectly coordinate (as assumed in the model), the Pareto weight
of the internal examiner should be 0.2 (reflecting the fact that four exter-
nal faced a single internal examiner). Let us take this value as a bench-
mark against which contrasting our results.
In the double-qualification case with elected committees (reform = 0)
the bounds we find depict a narrow range for the Pareto weight of the
internal examiner, going from 0.527 to 0.605. In the single qualification
case, where exact identification is achieved, γ is slightly smaller (0.455),
but still points to a preeminent role of the internal examiner as compared
to the benchmark, even when reaching a decision is made more difficult
by the impossibility of trading candidates within a given concorso. These
estimates support the hypothesis that schools tend to replicate the status
quo by recruiting candidates with a scientific standing similar to that of
incumbent faculty.
In the double qualification case, the introduction of randomization
in the composition of the committees (reform = 1) possibly widened the
range of Pareto weights, although estimates are rather imprecise. We
cannot thus exclude that γ decreased, but even in this case the internal
examiner would have kept a substantial role. In the single qualification
case, the post-reform Pareto weight of the internal examiner is not sig-
nificantly different from its pre-reform level, thought the point estimate
is negative.18
18Note also that there is no clear evidence against the hypothesis that the coefficients of
GPS1(X) and GPS2(X) are indeed the product of (pic1 − 1) , for c = 1, 2, s and θ1 and
Table 5: Double qualification
Two Stage Procedure Single Stage Procedure (OLS)
Parameter First Stage Second Stage Second Stage
Idoneo 2 Idoneo 1 (Winner) Idoneo 2 Idoneo 1 (Winner)
∆H
σ 1.345***
(0.391)
∆L
σ -2.677***
(0.413)
1
σ 0.074**
(0.036)
θ1
σ -0.211
(0.142)
θ2
σ -0.079***
(0.022)
pi.1 0.535*** 0.595*** 0.527*** 0.605***
(0.179) (0.152) (0.092) (0.080)
pi.2 -0.071 0.142 -0.174 0.027
(0.169) (0.153) (0.122) (0.121)
(pi.1-1)θ1 -0.206 0.100 -0.296* 0.073
(0.394) (0.305) (0.161) (0.162)
(pi.1-1)θ2 0.091** 0.034 0.030 -0.003
(0.045) (0.037) (0.025) (0.023)
σ 13.519**
(6.563)
∆H 18.190*
(10.479)
∆L -36.192**
(17.646)
θ1 -2.846 0.442 -0.246
(1.902) (0.920) (0.733)
test θ1 [p-val] [0.063] [0.128]
θ2 -1.067* -0.194* -0.083
(0.604) (0.093) (0.733)
test θ2 [p-val] [0.109] [0.081]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The upper panel reports estimates as obtained from modified probit (column 1), truncated
regressions (columns 2 and 3), and OLS on the sub-sample of concorsi ended with an
appointment (column 3). The lower panel reports the implied structural parameters.
Standard errors of columns 1 to 3 are obtained by parametric bootstrapping the two stage
procedure.
Table 6: Single qualification
Two-Stage Procedure Single-Stage Procedure (OLS)
Parameter First Stage Second Stage - Winner Winner
∆H
σ 0.950**
(0.395)
∆L
σ -3.780**
(1.675)
1
σ 0.178
(0.109)
θ1
σ -0.427*
(0.230)
θ2
σ -0.084**
(0.036)
pis1 0.458*** 0.455***
(0.162) (0.136)
pis2 -0.165 -0.151
(0.248) (0.302)
(pis1 − 1)θ1 0.039 -0.088
(0.231) (0.203)
(pis1 − 1)θ2 -0.025 -0.059
(0.031) (0.044)
σ 5.614
(3.437)
∆H 5.332
(3.600)
∆L -21.221**
(10.597)
θ1 -2.396* -0.072
(1.226) (0.417)
test θ1 [p-val] [0.064]
θ2 -0.470* 0.047
(0.274) (0.059)
test θ2 [p-val] [0.058]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The upper panel reports estimates as obtained from modified probit (column 1), truncated
regressions (column 2), and OLS on the sub-sample of concorsi ended with an appointment
(column 3). The lower panel reports the implied structural parameters. Standard errors of
columns 1 and 2 are obtained by parametric bootstrapping the two stage procedure.
2.7 Discussion
From a repeated game perspective, academia played an equilibrium that
granted each university the right of deciding the candidate to be pro-
moted or recruited, at its sole discretion. External examiners accepted
rather passively the choice of the recruiting school, fearing retaliation in
the concorsi called by their own school in future. Given schools’ prefer-
ence for the status quo, at equilibrium each school was allowed to recruit
a candidate of quality comparable to that of the incumbent faculty. Our
analysis indicates that government attempts to alter this equilibrium by
introducing new procedural rule failed as academia devised successful
strategies to bypass the new formal constraints.
In this section we discuss three potential concerns regarding our re-
sults and interpretation.
First, a hiring pattern observationally equivalent to that obtained by
schools recruiting scholars with a scientific quality similar to that of the
incumbent faculty could be the result of a very different process. Sup-
pose that candidates self-sort in the concorsi called by the schools closest
to them in terms of scientific quality. If so, even if schools preferred to
appoint the candidate with the highest standing to improve their quality,
self-sorting would constraint their choice and schools would be forced
to hire candidates that de facto replicate the status quo. If this were the
case, however, in concorsi with double qualification, where we observe
two applicants, we should systematically have that the winner’s quality
is higher than the second idoneo quality. In fact, only in one third of the
cases H1 exceeds H2 as shown in Figure (3), where we report the distri-
bution of (H1 −H2) both before and after the reform.
Second, the lack of effect of the reforms that we find might be due
to the countervailing influence of other policies. The only significant
change occurred in the period under consideration was the rule enacted
in 2009 that imposed of replacing at most 20 percent of all retirements in
academia, a provision that significantly reduced the number of callable
positions. However, this policy should have reinforced rather than off-
θ2 respectively (see the bottom panels of Tables 5 and 6).
Figure 3: Distribution of H1 −H2
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set the effect of the reform we analyze in this paper, given that it should
have strengthen the competition among universities, being fewer posi-
tions available. Accordingly, the Pareto weight of the internal examiner
should have decreased in contrast with the evidence we found.
Third, throughout the analysis we have maintained that all the char-
acteristics of the examiners relevant for their preferences over candidates
can be summarized by a unique index of scientific productivity, the h-
index as computed on the Google Scholar dataset of publications. Even
leaving aside the possible bias of the h-index as a measure of scientific
productivity, there might be other individual characteristics, that influ-
ence the choice of the examiners, such as affinity in the field of research
between candidates and examiners, a scientific potential of candidates
not yet captured by the h-index, the role played by the affiliation of the
candidates and the role played by academic and extra-academic ties.
Nonetheless, summary statistics fit well with model implications and
make us confident that the possible specification errors we commit are
not such that of invalidating our main conclusions.
2.8 Conclusions
We have analyzed the effect of two reforms of the recruitment system
in Italian universities whose purpose was that of increasing meritocracy
by making external examiners more independent and by reducing the
opportunities of collusion within committees. We have argued that the
purpose of these reforms contrasted with the fundamental incentive of
large proportions of schools and incumbent scholars of maintaining the
status quo and continuing to benefit of sizable rents.
To study the effect of the reforms, we have derived a theoretical mo-
del that represents the process of negotiation within evaluation commit-
tees in a way that accounts for the evidence that a non negligible share of
concorsi ended up without appointment (failures). The theoretical model
implies a simple decision rule that turns out to be a linear function of in-
ternal and external examiners qualities and allows to (partially) identify
the Pareto weight of the internal examiner. The empirical counterpart of
the decision rule has been estimated on the data from all concorsi called
by the schools of economics in Italy and concluded between 2004 and
2011.
According to our estimations, neither the introduction of randomiza-
tion of external examiners nor the reduction in the number of qualifica-
tions from two to one did significantly change the relative weight of the
internal examiner on the evaluation committee.
The implication of our analysis is that procedural rules are little ef-
fective in modifying agents behaviors when they contrast with agents
fundamental incentives. Changing procedural rules risks to load fur-
ther administrative burden and costs without any substantial benefit. In
the case of the recruitment system in Italian academia, reforms aiming
to reward schools’ scientific standing would be much more effective in
making the adoption of meritocracy in schools’ own interest.
Appendix A
In this appendix we characterize the solution of the negotiation problem
between internal and external examiners.
We distinguish between two regimes, the appointment and the failure
regime. In both cases we can have either an internal or a corner solution.
Internal and corner solutions are linked to the structural parameters of
the problem by different functional forms. As we are able to observe only
what is the prevailing regime and not whether the solution is internal or
corner, we need to determine under what conditions there is a one-to-one
relation between observed regime and type of solution.
Assume hi > he. The symmetric case is analogous.
Consider first the agreement regime.
The internal solution is
h∗1 =
αγ
K
hi +
β(1− γ)
K
he
h∗2 =
(1− α)γ
1−K hi +
(1− β)(1− γ)
1−K he
with
K = γα+ (1− γ)β
The internal examiner utility at that solution is
Ui = −(hi − hc)2Γi
the external examiner utility is
Uc = −(hi − hc)2Γc
and the value of the problem is
WA = −(hi − hc)2 [γΓi + (1− γ)Γe]
where
Γi = (1− γ)2
[
αβ2
K2
+
(1− α)(1− β)2
(1−K)2
]
Γe = γ
2
[
α2β
K2
+
(1− α)2(1− β)
(1−K)2
]
and
P = [γΓi + (1− γ)Γe] = γ(1− γ)
[
αβ
K
+
(1− α)(1− β)
1−K
]
It is easy to check that 0 < Γi < 1, 0 < Γe < 1 and 0 < P < γ.
The condition which separates the internal from the corner solution
is −(hi − hc)2Γi > −U i i.e. we observe an internal solution if
(hi − hc)2 6 U i
Γi
and a corner solution otherwise.
The corner solution satisfies the first order conditions of the Lagrangian
L = W − λ(−U¯i − Ui)
with λ > 0.
At the corner solution, the marginal rate of substitution between h1
and h2 needs to be equalized between the internal and the external exam-
iners and, furthermore, the corner solution needs to satisfy the constraint
Ui(h1, h2) = −U i. These two conditions are enough to derive the con-
strained maximizer (hc1, hc2). The superscript c indicates the constrained
solution. Moreover exploiting the positivity of the Lagrangian multiplier
we obtain
hc1 >
αγ
K
hi +
β(1− γ)
K
he
and
hc2 >
(1− α)γ
1−K hi +
(1− β)(1− γ)
1−K he
Thus, for the parameter combinations such that the constraint is binding,
the constrained solution is certainly preferable to the internal examiner
compared to what he would have obtained if the constraint were not
protecting himself. Indeed, the internal examiner, obtains UAci = −U i
regardless of his relative bargaining power and the values of hiand he.
Correspondingly, the utility of the external examiner, denoted UAce is cer-
tainly lower compared to what he could obtain were the constraint not
active. The value of the problem is WAc = γ(−U i) +(1−γ)UAce and note
that it is certainly smaller than the value of the unconstrained problem
for the same parameters profile.
Next, consider the failure regime.
In this case (h1, h2) are such that Ui 6 −U i. The internal examiner is
protected and obtains−U i , but no qualified candidate will be appointed.
This implies that the external examiner can freely decide about the candi-
dates, however at the additional cost δ that represents the utility loss due
to the fact that no one of his preferred candidates will be immediately
appointed.
In this regime the internal solution corresponds to the bliss point of
the external examiners, i.e.
h1 = h2 = he
At the internal solution Ui < −U i (strictly smaller) and particularly
Ui(he, he) = −(hi−he)2. Therefore, the condition for an internal solution
can be expressed as
(hi − he)2 > U i
The corresponding value of the problem is
WF = γ(−U i) + (1− γ)(−δ)
For parameters configuration such that the constraint is binding, i.e.
when (hi − he)2 6 U i, the solution will correspond to the point on the
constraint Ui = −U i that is closer to the external examiner bliss point.
Note that since internal examiner’s preferences do not play any role in
this choice, the constrained solutions of the failure and the appointment
regimes will not coincide in general. The value of the problem is
WFc = γ(−U i) + (1− γ)(UFce − δ)
where UFce is external examiner’s payoff at the constraint solution.
The value of WFc will be certainly smaller than the value of the uncon-
strained problem for the same parameters profile.
Finally, comparing the two regimes, we have:
• For U i < (hi − he)2 < UiΓi , it is WA > WF if
(hi − he)2 < ∆ = γU i + (1− γ)δ
P
(2.16)
The quantity ∆ belongs to the interval
[
U i,
Ui
Γi
]
if
U i >
Γi
Γe
δ (2.17)
and otherwise it is larger than UiΓi . In all cases either the appoint-
ment or the failure internal solution is optimal.
• for (hi − he)2 > UiΓi we compare the appointment regime’s con-
strained solution with the failure regime’s internal solution. If con-
dition (2.17) holds, the latter certainly dominates. Indeed, for all
(hi − he)2 > ∆ we have that WF > WAand thus it must also be
that WF > WAc.
• Similarly, for (hi − he)2 < U i, the solution of the problem is the
agreement region’s internal solution. Indeed for all (hi − he)2 < ∆
we have that WA > WF and thus is must also be that WA > WFc.
Summing up, if condition (2.17) holds, or, in words, if the cost of failure is
sufficiently small, either the internal solution of the appointment regime
or the internal solution of the failure regime prevails. Otherwise it is
possible to observe, for some (hi − he)2 > UiΓi the appointment regime’s
constrained solution. Intuitively, when the cost of the failure is large, it
cannot be compensated by the additional utility enjoyed by the external
examiner in the failure regime, corresponding to the freedom of choosing
his preferred candidates.
Appendix B - one qualification
When only one candidate is to be qualified, the model simplifies as fol-
lows.
Ui = −(hi − h1)2
Ue = −(he − h1)2
and
W =
{
γUi + (1− γ)Ue Ui > −U¯i
γ(−U¯i) + (1− γ) (Ue − δ) Ui < −U¯i
Also in this case we treat separately the appointment and the failure
regime and we assume hi > he.
In the appointment regime, which occurs when (hi − h1)2 6 U¯i, the
internal solution is
h1 = γhi + (1− γ)he
and
Ui = −(1− γ)2(hi − he)2
Ue = −γ2(hi − he)2
WA = −γ(1− γ)(hi − he)2
This regime prevails if
(hi − he)2 < U¯i
(1− γ)2
Otherwise, for (hi − he)2 > U¯i(1−γ)2 the constrained solution occurs,
which satisfies the Lagrangian L = γUi + (1 − γ)Ue − λ(−U¯i − Ui). At
the constrained solution hc1 satisfies (hi − hc1)2 = U¯i and it is larger than
it would have been in the unconstrained problem. This guarantees the
internal examiner’s utility to remain at Ui = −U¯i at the expense of the
external examiner utility denoted again U ce . The value of the problem is
WAc = γ(-U¯i) + (1− γ)U ce .
The failure regime occurs when (hi−h1)2 > U¯i. The internal solution
corresponds to the bliss point of the external examiner
h1 = hc
The value of the problem is
WF = γ(−U¯i) + (1− γ)(−δ)
At the bliss point the constraint is slack and equals to (hi−he)2 > U¯i.
When (hi − he)2 6 U¯i the internal solution is not viable. At the con-
strained solution the external examiner does not obtain his bliss point.
The selected candidate hc1 is such that (hi − hc1)2 = U¯i and the external
examiner’s utility is U ce .19 The value of the problem is
WFc = γ(−U¯i) + (1− γ)(U ce − δ)
Comparing the two regimes:
For U¯i < (hi − he)2 < U¯i(1−γ)2 we have WA > WF when
(hi − he)2 < Θ = γU¯i + (1− γ)δ
γ(1− γ) (2.18)
19Compared to Appendix A, external examiner’s utility at the constrained solution is
the same in both regimes. This fact occurs because no substitution among candidates is
possible in the problem with only one qualified candidate.
The quantity Θ is internal to
[
U¯i,
U¯i
(1−γ)2
]
for
U¯i >
(1− γ)2
γ2
δ (2.19)
When condition (2.19) holds, either the internal solution of the appoint-
ment regime or the internal solution of the failure regime solve the max-
imization problem. Indeed, for (hi − he)2 > U¯i(1−γ)2 , we have that WAc <
WF (since WAc would be dominated by WA if the constrained were not
active) and for (hi − he)2 < U¯i , we have that WA > WFc (since WFc
would be dominated by WF if the constrained were not active).
Finally, note that the case with a single qualification can be derived
from the case with two qualifications by setting α = β = 1. Indeed, in
this case, Γi = (1− γ)2 , Γe = γ2 and P = γ(1− γ).
Appendix C - elasticity of the threshold.
The small size of the samples at hand has forced us to pool together con-
corsi with elected and randomized committees. As a result, the empirical
model estimated over the pooled sample assumes that the threshold sep-
arating agreement from failure is the same in both types of procedures.
Since the threshold depends on γ, this restriction is questionable, unless
the threshold is little sensitive to variations of γ.
In this appendix we compute the elasticity of
√
∆, (see equation 2.16),
with respect to γ, denoted ε√∆γ Such elasticity is a rather complicate
function of γ and of all other parameters. To simplify its expression, con-
sider the following reparametrization (up to a small loss of generality).
Let be α = 12 +
m
2 , β =
1
2 − m2 so that m = α− β.
A linearization of ε√∆γ around γ =
1
2 , the midpoint of the domain of
γ, yields
ε√∆γ(γ) '
(
1
2 − δUi+δ
)
+
+2
[
(1−m2) + 2 δ
Ui+δ
(
1
2 − δUi+δ
)] (
γ − 12
) (2.20)
Since at γ = 12 , it is U i > δ (by condition 2.17), both the intercept and
the slope coefficient are positive.
In particular, at γ = 12 , the elasticity simplifies to
ε√∆γ
(
γ =
1
2
)
=
1
2
− δ
(U i + δ)
and it is bounded above by 12 .
Moreover, the elasticity is monotonically decreasing in δ and largest
when δ = 0. In this case, the least favorable, expression (2.20) becomes
ε√∆γ(γ) '
1
2
+ 2(1−m2)
(
γ − 1
2
)
Hence, at γ = 34 it is ε
√
∆γ(
3
4 ) = 1− 12m2 and at γ = 14 it is ε√∆γ( 14 ) = 12m2.
We conclude that for a large range of values of γ,
√
∆ is inelastic.
The elasticity of
√
Θ - the corresponding threshold in the single qual-
ification case (see equation 2.18) - behaves similarly.
Appendix D - truncation adjustment.
In this section we derive the adjustment to account for truncation in
equations (2.12) and (2.13). Define:
I∗ = hi − he = θ0 + (Hi −He) + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X) + ε
=Ω + ε
Its expectation conditional on agreement is
E
(
I∗| −
√
∆ 6 I∗ 6
√
∆
)
= Ω + Ξ
where
Ξ = E
(
ε| −
√
∆ 6 I∗ 6
√
∆
)
=
=σ
[
φ
(
−√∆
σ
− Ω
σ
)
− φ
(√
∆
σ
− Ω
σ
)]
/
[
Φ
(
−√∆
σ
− Ω
σ
)
− Φ
(√
∆
σ
− Ω
σ
)]
is the conditional expectation of ε ∼ N(0, σ2), φ and Φ are the density
and the cumulative distribution of a standard normal respectively.
In the pre-reform period, equation (2.12) is
H1 −He = pi11(Hi −He)+
+ (pi11 − 1) (θ0 + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X)) + (pi11 − 1) ε
and its expectation conditional on agreement is
E
(
H1 −He| −
√
∆ 6 I∗ 6
√
∆
)
= pi11(Hi −He)+
+ (pi11 − 1) (θ0 + θ1GPS1(X) + θ2GPS2(X)) + (pi11 − 1) Ξ (2.21)
Parameters of equation (2.21) can be estimated by means of the fol-
lowing adjusted regression
˜(H1 −He) = pi10+pi11 ˜(Hi −He)+pi13GPS1(X)+pi14GPS2(X)+ξ (2.22)
where
˜(H1 −He) = (H1 −He) + Ξ
˜(Hi −He) = (Hi −He) + Ξ
(2.23)
and ξ is a IID error term. Similarly we proceed after the reform, and
for equation (2.13) and equation (2.14).
Chapter 3
Budget cuts and brain
drain: the case of Italian
universities
It appears evidently from
experience that a man is of all
sorts of luggage the most
difficult to be transported
A. Smith, 1776
3.1 Introduction
Italy is one of the OECD countries with the highest rate of skilled labour
emigration. In 2000, almost half million of high skill Italians resided
abroad (Docquier and Marfouk, 2004). Such outflows coupled with the
inability to attract skilled foreigners led many authors to point at an “Ital-
ian brain drain” (Becker et al., 2004; Biondo et al., 2012). High skill mi-
gration is a particular economic concern because of the high human cap-
ital transfers involved and its impact on productivity (Hornung, 2014)
and innovation (Chellaraj et al., 2008; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010).
Universities are generally regarded as fundamental for innovation, more
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so in Italy where over 30% of research and development personnel works
at universities (Istat, 2014). In this paper we focus specifically on these
subjects and investigate whether the deterioration of careers prospects
induced by budget constraints prompted researchers to leave Italian aca-
demia. Indeed, severe personnel expenses cap were selectively imposed
on Italian universities in 2009. The new regulation prevented institutions
with staff expenses above a certain threshold from hiring and promoting
professors. Not surprisingly, the norm induced a reduction in new hires
and promotions that brought the number of professors employed in Ital-
ian universities down by 15% between 2008 and 2013. Besides the block
on entries, the decline resulted also from an increasing number of pro-
fessors leaving academia. While aging and changes in the recruitment
process may explain part of the outflows, both its timing and magnitude
deserve further analysis. In this paper we investigate whether budget
constrains on personnel expenses backfired by inducing Italian profes-
sor to quit their positions for private companies or foreign institutions.
We argue that a prolonged alt in promotions may have affected careers
outlooks and may have reduced expected earnings of Italian professors.
Differentials in labour incomes are indeed regarded as the most impor-
tant economic determinants of migration (Sjaastad, 1962, Borjas, 1991).
Besides expected earnings, whether individuals decide to quit their posi-
tions depends, among others, on the size of outside opportunities. With
this respect, Italian researchers were not the only one dealing with re-
duced funding. Similar concerns rose, for example, in the US during the
negotiation between democrats and republicans over debt-ceiling deals
(Gulledge, 2011). Yet in Italy these budget constraints were planned on
multiple years (in fact they are still in place) and they were relatively easy
to predict resulting possibly in greater impact on expectations. Empiri-
cal work on the link between economic crisis, public universities funding
and potential outflows of researchers is surprisingly scarce. To fill this
gap, we exploit the selectivity of the new regulation along with its time
variation in a quasi-experimental framework. Preliminary results indi-
cate an increase in voluntary leaves among institutions with more severe
staff limitations. Surprisingly the latter show lower voluntary leaves on
average in both pre and post reform periods. We provide some expla-
nations for these results and point out the limits of our methodologies
for future investigations. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
section 3.2 presents the institutional setting and the dataset, section 3.3
summarizes the main trends in Italian universities in terms of promo-
tions, new hires and voluntary leaves, section 3.4 presents the economet-
ric models and their preliminary results, section 3.5 briefly discuss their
common findings and limits along with alternative explanations. Finally
section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional setting and dataset
Italian universities fund their activities mostly through transfers from
the central government. The larger among these goes under the name of
“ordinary fund” (FFO1) possibly due to the fact that it is determined on
historical basis. The high share of resources spent on personnel is among
the reasons for the survival of such funding scheme. Indeed, cutting this
fund in favor of, for example, mechanism tied to research performance,
would expose many university to potential deficits given the rigidity of
personnel expenses. An attempt to constrain staff expenses was fist set
in 1999 when the Italian legislator set the limit of staff turn-over to 35%
of the savings from retirements for those universities with personnel ex-
penses exceeding 90% of the FFO2. Despite that, personnel expenses kept
increasing inasmuch the legislator made the prescription more severe in
2009. From then until 2012, institutions exceeding the 90% prescription
are prevented from hiring ( 0% turn-over) while those below the thresh-
old are subject to a 50% limit. Finally, a more complex index to determine
turn-over regimes was set in 20123. Figure 4 summarizes this setting. The
graph shows how maximum percentage staff turn-over varies with the
ratio of personnel expenses over the ordinary fund (AF/FFO) on the y-
axis and over time on the x-axis.
1From the Italian fondo di finanziamento ordinario
2Law 449/1997 art. 1 co. 4
3This index accounts for, among others, student enrollment fees and debt. See D.lgs
49/2012 art. 5 and 7.
Figure 4: Maximum staff turn over
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This paper wants to assess the impact of tighter job market conditions
on the movements of researchers in Italian universities. For this reason
we compare two legislative periods: i) pre-reform from 1999 to 2008 and
ii) post-reform from 2009 to 2012. The data we need are essentially of two
types. The first is financial data on university and in particular on the
ratio between staff expenses and ordinary fund essential for determin-
ing which regime applies. This data is available for the period 2004 -
2011 and was provided directly from the Minister of Education. Interest-
ingly, the minister had no data for the period 1999 - 2003, although per-
sonnel caps were already in place. This possibly points to low or even
no enforcement of turn-over regulations in early periods. With respect
to the period covered in the data, the majority of institutions are below
the limit. The number of those crossing it gradually increases over time
while a minority of institutions repeatedly move back and forth as shown
in figure 5.
The second type of data regards the career of Italian researchers. With
this respect, we track inflows, outflows and movements across Italian
Figure 5: Institutions exceeding staff limits
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universities for each professor in the period 1996 - 2013 thanks to micro
data also made available by the Minister of Education. Crucially, any
outflow is motivated so that we can distinguish retirements and resigna-
tions from other personal reasons to leave. Table 7 summarizes the main
trends relating professors movements. Note that the overall number of
professors reaches a peak in 2008 and then decreases drastically due to a
combined reduction in entries and increase in exits. Movements across
universities are negligible throughout the period while also showing a
contraction starting in 2009. When combined together, these sources of
information provide us with a complete picture only from 2005 to 20114.
Nevertheless, we use the longer panel on professors in many descrip-
tives and in part of the econometric analysis whenever the assumptions
needed are plausible.
4Regulation looks at previous year personnel expenses so that, with this respect, 2004 is
lost.
Table 7: Dataset overview
Year Present Inflows Moves Outflows of which: voluntary leave retirement other exits
1996 49469 1205 514 1177 259 731 187
1997 49187 787 584 1070 488 400 182
1998 49956 1546 2150 770 189 391 190
1999 50767 1765 758 947 302 440 205
2000 51988 2251 630 1022 352 473 197
2001 54852 3918 1007 1061 366 530 165
2002 57516 3753 683 1081 313 573 195
2003 56458 221 325 1253 463 600 190
2004 57363 2009 434 1118 407 540 171
2005 60240 4015 604 1141 375 595 171
2006 61986 3109 422 1381 534 678 169
2007 61908 1531 273 1599 630 796 173
2008 62768 2669 384 1822 573 1064 185
2009 60858 492 185 2378 831 1396 151
2010 57735 1194 115 4325 1340 2850 135
2011 56451 1454 244 2739 1005 1599 135
2012 54925 579 174 2101 704 1275 122
2013 53530 10 102 1546 396 1047 103
3.3 Descriptives
A drastic increase in outflows is visible in table 7 in 2009. The trend pos-
sibly starts in 2005 and reaches its maximum in 2010 when outflows are
roughly four times the average in 2000-2005. Nevertheless, these exits
are highly heterogeneous and refer to retirements, voluntary leaves, dis-
ciplinary lay-offs etc. The first two account for the majority of exits and
show a similar pattern over time. While both exit decisions may be af-
fected by the new regulation, we concentrate particularly on voluntary
leaves in the sections that follow. Indeed, this is the most intuitive chan-
nel through which individuals may want to leave academia as a reaction
to a worsening of careers outlook. With this respect, figure 6 reports in-
crements in staff expenses due to promotions and new hires. The impli-
cations of the picture are twofolds. First, individuals face tighter labour
market conditions with few advancements in career possible in the over-
all market. Second, institutions with higher imbalances (red lines) seem
to contract increments in expenses more than the blue ones with no or
few (after 2009) constraints. Despite the figures are generally in line with
the regulatory setting in place, the latter still does not explain why insti-
Figure 6: Increments in personnel costs: promotions and new hires
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Note: Staff equivalent units (y-axis) are based on the following equivalences:
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tion from associate to full professor would cost 0.3 equivalent units. Red and
blue lines are limited due to lack of data on universities expenditures.
tutions below the limit should reduce promotions and new hires before
2009, when they are completely unconstrained. This may point to some
anticipation effect or other confounders that we consider in the next sec-
tions.
3.3.1 Individual level evidence
We ask whether a worse job market outlook induced by the new reg-
ulation triggered extensive outflows from Italian academia. Whether
this is the case depends on various factors such as information, ratio-
nality and outside options. Complete information allows individuals to
predict worse career outlook and to form correct expectations with re-
spect to future earnings. On the other hand, rationality and the existence
of alternatives abroad and outside academia determine how individu-
als react to these expectations. The higher the outside option the more
likely researchers will leave their current positions. In the present set-
ting, widespread political debate over the new regulation coupled with
a simple and highly predictable prescription seems to be an ideal setting
for individuals to form accurate expectations. Therefore, individuals in
institutions above the personnel expenses limit should have worse ex-
pectation ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the presence of appealing
outside options is more problematic. Indeed, the economic downturn re-
duced both chances of getting academic positions abroad (e.g. Carulli,
2013) and possibilities of being hired in the private sector. Further, the
extent of outside options should clearly vary along scientific fields with
“hard sciences” being generally less affected by the crisis (Oreopoulos
et al., 2012) and more international disciplines such as medicine and en-
gineering showing smaller costs of migration. Before moving to a more
rigorous analysis we give a sense of the impact of such variability on the
probability to voluntary leave in table 8. We report probit average partial
effects separately for 1) pre and 2) post reform of the following equation:
yi = α+ β agei + γ areai + δ seniorityi + η universityi + εi
where yi is a binary variable equal to 1 if individual i voluntary leaves
university, areai is a vector of dummies for scientific areas5, seniorityi
controls for individual i being assistant, associate or full professor and
universityi is a vector of university controls. For simplicity we neglect
the time dimension of data here. Time varying factors such as age and
seniority are set equal to their levels in i) the year when the individual
left or in ii) some random year for those who have never left.
We set as reference categories those with lower propensity to leave
and indicate them with a dot (.) in table 8. These categories are civil en-
gineering and architecture among scientific disciplines and full profes-
sor among seniority levels. As anticipated hard sciences show an higher
propensity to leave along with medicine and economics. As for senior-
ity we see two opposite effects: a positive one for age and a negative
5as defined by National University Council (CUN)
Table 8: Probability of voluntary leave
(1) (2)
APE pre APE post
age 0.00625∗∗∗ 0.00838∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
math 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
fisics 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0126∗
(0.005) (0.005)
chemistry 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
geology 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
biology 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
medicine 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
agriculture and veterinary 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
civil engineering, architecture . .
(.) (.)
industrial engineering 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
litterature 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
history, filosofy and psico 0.00946∗ 0.0228∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
law 0.00635 0.00832
(0.004) (0.005)
econ and statistics 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
political sciences 0.00406 0.00254
(0.005) (0.006)
assistant professor 0.0869∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
associate professor 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
full professor . .
(.) (.)
male -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 65744 64470
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
one for tenure. The sign for associate and full professors are negative
as expected since these individuals should have lower incentives to quit
thanks to relatively established careers. Despite that, the sign of age is
puzzling here since we expect youngsters to be more likely to leave due,
for example, to weaker familiar ties. On the contrary, the sign of the coef-
ficient is positive and its marginal effect is non negligible in magnitude.
Finally, little changes occurs between pre and post reform.
3.3.2 University level evidence
We now move to investigate university variation. In particular, we want
to see whether being subject to tighter personnel regulations results in
higher dropouts. Figure 7 shows voluntary leave rates for university
below and above the 90% limit separately for assistant, associate and full
professors.
In all three plots the blue patter shows hikes in 2010: exactlty one year
after the new regulation was set in place. On the other hand, institutions
with higher personnel expenses (red line) present an unstable pattern
with higher variation over time and a clear increasing trend only for full
professors. Besides variation, these institutions also show lower exits
compared to their reference group. This puzzling result maybe due to
low cardinality / high sample variability of the group or to institutions
switching from one group to the other one or more times as we reported
in figure 5. While little can be done against the first potential problem
the second one may be easily addressed by restricting the sample. These
and other possible solutions are investigated in the next section.
3.4 Methods
We use terminology and notation developed in experimental analysis
(Rubin, 1974) to formalize the relation between new regulation and vol-
untary leaves. Define the treatment for unit i at time t as:
Dit = 1(af/ffoit−1 > 90%)
Figure 7: Incidence of voluntary leaves by seniority
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That is unit i is treated if personnel expenses in the previous year ex-
ceeded the regulatory limit6. Also define a binary variable Pt = 1(t ≥
2009) to describe the introduction of tighter rules in 2009. Further as-
sume for simplicity a linear relation of the type:
yit = β0 + β1Dit + β2(Dit × Pt) + β3Cit + εit (3.1)
where Cit is a matrix of controls including the vectors for seniority, uni-
versity, scientific fields and year controls. Equation 3.1 is know as a dif-
ference in difference estimator (e.g. Card, 1992) because the interaction
parameter β2 compares the change in the time dimension (before mi-
nus after) in the outcome variable in the treatment group with the same
change for the control group. In the present setting this amount to com-
pare the propensity to leave before and after the introduction of new reg-
ulation (2009) for university below and above the threshold of personnel
expenses. In the absence of confounders, the coefficient β2 identifies the
causal effect of the new regulation on the propensity to leave the system.
Specialized readers may notice a slight variation to the standard frame-
work in equation 3.1. Indeed, we are including university controls in Cit
that would be collinear with Dit were not for the fact that some universi-
ties happened to switch group (i.e. move below and above the threshold)
over time (see figure 5). The possible implications of this peculiarity will
be investigated in more details in section 3.4.1.
Before putting equation 3.1 into operation, we need to define the basic
statistical unit i. This is non trivial since the determinants on the right
hand side of equation 3.1 vary at different levels of aggregation. Indeed,
treatment status Dit varies at university level while seniority and sci-
entific field vary at individual level. Further, it would be tempting to
use micro data at individual level but unfortunately we would derive
misleading standard errors for the β2 coefficient we are most interested
6 An alternative specification with a continuous variable af/ffoit−1 was also inves-
tigated yielding similar results. Note that the latter is quite an appealing definition of
treatment. Indeed, professors may update their career expectations progressively as their
university approaches the threshold rather than abruptly once it is overcome. This specifi-
cation yield similar results so that we present the simpler and more common binary speci-
fication of treatment.
in. Indeed, if we take individual as reference unit, the data are unlikely
to be independent across observations. The propensity to leave tent to
be correlated among professors from the same university because they
share common characteristics and are exposed to the same environment.
Moulton (1986) shows that by assuming a simple additive structure with
an individual component and a group component the resulting standard
errors increase sharply as the intra-class correlation and the group size
increases. While more elaborate solutions exist7, the most simple one
is to use groups as fundamental statistical units in place of individu-
als. This amounts to set i as a generic university in equation 3.1 and to
compute shares of individual varying factors such as seniority, scientific
fields and voluntary leaves.
Estimates of equation 3.1 at university level are reported in table 9.
The baseline in column 1 combines all levels of seniority while the re-
maining columns stratify on that. The interaction coefficient is positive
as expected indicating that the new rules incremented voluntary leaves
in universities with personnel imbalances of .008 more than those below
the regulatory limit. Also the magnitude appears relevant given that that
voluntary leaves are usually 1− 2% per year as reported in table 7 so the
coefficient translates in an increase of 50 − 100%. Once we stratify by
levels of seniority in the remaining columns, the significance seems to
be driven mainly by assistant professors (column 2). Despite such in-
crease, it is surprising that treated university experience lower average
voluntary leaves before and even after the reform. To see this note the
coefficient for Dit is always negative and almost always greater in mag-
nitude than that for the interaction term. Leaving aside the effect of the
reform, we need to figure out why professors in institutions with budget
imbalances systematically show a lower propensity to voluntary leave
their institutions. If we believe our model correct, then a tentative ex-
planation maybe that these institutions are most likely of lower quality
compared to those with sound budgets. Then their professors face worse
outside opportunities and therefore are more strongly tied to their cur-
7See for example Angrist and Pischke (2008, pp. 233-235).
Table 9: Difference in difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline assistant p. associate p. full p.
Dit -0.0084∗∗ -0.0131∗∗ -0.0035 -0.0077
(0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Dit × Pt 0.0080∗ 0.0110∗ 0.0035 0.0099
(0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0058)
β0 -0.0215 -0.2043∗∗ -0.2245 -0.1501
(0.1327) (0.0738) (0.1145) (0.1516)
% scientific field Yes Yes Yes Yes
% seniority Yes No No No
university controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 455 446 447 455
R2 0.633 0.427 0.526 0.542
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
rent position 8. Then despite the reform affects their career perspective
more on average than colleagues in other institutions as measured by the
interaction coefficient, the effect on expectations does not overcome the
lower outside options these individual face in both pre and post reform
periods.
Nevertheless, on the econometric side, there may be good reasons to
delve further in equation 3.1. First, akin to survival analysis the decision
to leave is clearly time dependent in that individuals must trivially have
not left before. This time dependence introduces a dynamic structure
in our model. Secondly, treated and untreated may be ill defined here.
Indeed, each university may have imbalances one year and recover the
year after. Ideally we should define a plan of treatments (Robins et al.,
1999) and compare each plan with a slight variation of it. Finally, we
may believe not the unconfoundness assumption and specifically point
to each university having its own time dependent vicissitudes, or in tech-
nical terms its own trend, before and after the reform. These concerns
will drive our analysis in the subsequent sections.
3.4.1 Structural break
In the present setting the treatment status is not homogeneously dis-
tributed within the two groups. Indeed, institutions generally experienc-
ing different length of budget imbalances as reported in figure 5. With
this respect, the difference in difference model of equation 3.1 neglects
the history of treatment up to time t so that institutions with a long his-
tory of imbalances such as “L’Orientale di Napoli” are assumed to expe-
rience the same treatment effect as relatively sound institutions with just
temporary excesses. Ideally, we would have many observations for each
“treatment plan” and compare plans with a similar sequence of budget
imbalances (Robins et al., 1999). Unfortunately, this is not possible in the
present setting given the small number of observations and the marked
differences in exposure to treatment. Following this line of reasoning,
we may doubt the existence of suitable comparison groups, focus only
8This is similar to results found in managerial literature on declining organizations (Be-
deian and Armenakis, 1998).
on one of them and exploit only the time variation in voluntary leaves.
This model is known as structural break as it parametrizes a “jump” in a
functional relation at a specific point in time. Identification depends on
the absence of confounders other than the reform, that may be responsi-
ble for such “jump”. Operatively, we pick up the most numerous group,
namely the never treated, consisting of 42 university. We then extend our
time span as much as we can in order to obtain reliable estimates of time
trends. This comes at the cost of assuming that institutions never treated
in the period 2005-2011 were also not treated in the period 1999-2004 for
which financial data is missing9. This allow us to extend the time frame
to the period 1996-2013 and possibly to obtain better estimates.
The plot of figure 8 gives us some graphical insights on how to para-
metrize the “jump” in the functional relation.
Note the pattern in figure 8 appears to increase in the years immedi-
ately following the reform and to decrease thereafter with a final level
possibly below the average one in the pre-reform period. To allow such
shift we need at least a second order polynomial function of the type:
yit = β0 + β1time fromreformt + β2time fromreform
2
t + β3Cit + εit
(3.2)
where time fromreformt = (t − 2008)+ are the number of years after
reform. Estimates are reported in table 10.
The positive and significant coefficient for time fromreform indi-
cates an increase in dropouts after the introduction of the new personnel
regulation. This trend subsequently fades out and becomes negative by
2011 as indicated by time to reform2.
These results are useful in quantifying the magnitude of the increase but
require further investigation. A more robust analysis would enrich equa-
tion 3.2 with parameters for other potential breaks as in Dincecco (2009).
In this way, the presence of unexpected significant breaks along the se-
ries would cast doubt on the results of table 10 and indicate that our
9Actually the requirement is less stringent. We just need the treatment to be homoge-
neous within the group so that years of imbalance are possible as long as they are common
to all universities in the group.
Table 10: Structural break
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline assistant p.. associate p. full p.
time fromreform 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0030 0.0086∗ 0.0073∗
(0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0031)
time fromreform2 -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0016∗ -0.0013∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
constant -0.0252 0.0282 -0.0288 0.0351
(0.0348) (0.0493) (0.0378) (0.0412)
% scientific field Yes Yes Yes Yes
% seniority Yes No No No
university controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 674 657 661 671
R2 0.518 0.216 0.323 0.388
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 8: Never treated and voluntary leaves by seniority
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parameters are possibly capturing some other source of variation over
time. Finally, were these tests inconclusive, we would still not be able
to exclude the presence of confounders responsible for the increase in
voluntary leaves around 2009. The difference along the cross section di-
mension in our diff-in-diff equation 3.1 was indeed in place to control for
that. Leaving proper tests on the timing of structural breaks and on its
funcional form for future analyses we now move to investigate a method
that might be able to control for university-specific trends.
3.4.2 Synthetic control
We started our analysis with a difference in difference approach that ex-
ploited many but heterogeneous universities and then possibly overshot
by retaining just few of them in the structural break of section 3.4.1. We
try now to strike a balance between the two by selecting two relatively
homogeneous groups. The first one consists of university with no budget
imbalances before 2009 but with personnel expenses above the threshold
in at least one year afterwards (NT/T). The second consists of universi-
ties never experiencing the treatment (NT/NT) as in section 3.4.1. The
analysis we propose is similar to synthetic control methods developed
in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). The first group serves as treated unit
against which we construct a synthetic control by weighting the char-
acteristics of universities from the second group. The methods is more
robust compared to difference in difference in that it allows for differ-
ent trends in the pre reform period (Abadie et al., 2010). Operatively the
construction of the synthetic group passes through the recursive mini-
mization of two quadratic problems:
V∗(w) = arg minV(w)(x1 −X0w)′V(x1 −X0w)
w∗ = arg minw(y1 −Y0w)′(y1 −Y0w)
s.t.
∑
j wj = 1, wj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J
(3.3)
where x1 is a k×1 vector of pre intervention determinants of the outcome
variable for the treated unit, X0 is a k × J matrix obtained by horizon-
tally stacking the same determinants for each unit j ∈ J in the control
group, y1 is a T × 1 vector of outcomes levels, one for each of the T pre
intervention periods and Y0 is its T × J analog for the group of controls.
The parameters to be estimated are the diagonal matrixV measuring the
relative importance of determinants x1 in the prediction of pre reform
voluntary leaves y1 and the vector of weightsw measuring the contribu-
tion of each control observation j ∈ J to the synthetic control.
Technically speaking, the first minimization problem along with the con-
straints on w serves as a regularization term to avoid overfitting. In this
exploratory analysis we simplify the problem and avoid this step by set-
ting V = I where I is the identity matrix.
Finally, synthetic control methods are usually implemented when there
exists just one treated unit. In the present setting we have several uni-
versities in the NT/T group. Rather than replicating the process for each
university in the latter, we use only their average to comply with the
usual setting.
Figure 9: Donor pool against treated unit
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Figure 9 shows the “donor pool” for the synthetic control. The dashed
lines represent the trend in log voluntary leaves for NT/NT universities.
Their optimal convex combination is used to construct the synthetic ana-
log of the treated unit represented here as the red line. Note the red line
falls almost always in the convex hull created by the dashed lines imply-
ing that we can expect a good fit in the pre reform period 10.
The optimal weights for the minimization problem 3.3 are reported in
table 11. Universities with high weights have voluntary leaves similar
to that of the average treated units. These universities are highly het-
erogeneous in dimensions, geographical location and quality, possibly a
consequence of skipping the first minimization problem.
Then voluntary leaves for the synthetic control are computed as:
yˆ1t = y0tw
where y0t is a 1 × J vector of voluntary leaves in the donor poll at time
t. Figure 10 plots average voluntary leaves for the treated units against
its synthetic analog. Note the two match closely in the pre reform pe-
riod so that we can leave apart any concern about universities in the
10Potentially this is a perfect fit in that we have 40 parameters, one per each university
in the donor pool against 14 equations (13 periods to predict plus the constraint on
∑
w).
The small deviations in figure 10 are most likely due to some universities in the donor pool
not present in all periods.
Table 11: Synthetic control weights
University Assistant p. Associate p. Full p.
Politecnico di TORINO 0,010 0,146 0,324
della CALABRIA 0,217 0,026 0,006
PALERMO 0,004 0,179 0,003
SASSARI 0,160 0,015 0,004
PARMA 0,009 0,087 0,156
Università IUAV di VENEZIA 0,071 0,126 0,004
MACERATA 0,001 0,001 0,116
TUSCIA 0,102 0,001 0,012
Politecnica delle MARCHE 0,009 0,090 0,017
Scuola Normale Superiore di PISA 0,087 0,000 0,002
VERONA 0,003 0,018 0,087
TRENTO 0,005 0,072 0,085
BERGAMO 0,082 0,005 0,005
Stranieri di PERUGIA 0,069 0,000 0,005
BRESCIA 0,007 0,046 0,004
CAGLIARI 0,009 0,001 0,040
BOLOGNA 0,014 0,005 0,036
ROMA TRE 0,036 0,004 0,004
PADOVA 0,021 0,030 0,006
CAMERINO 0,006 0,025 0,008
CATANIA 0,024 0,002 0,003
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna 0,006 0,001 0,019
BASILICATA 0,017 0,003 0,003
Politecnico di MILANO 0,006 0,014 0,004
SISSA - TRIESTE 0,001 0,006 0,013
TORINO 0,009 0,004 0,001
MILANO 0,004 0,003 0,009
SALENTO 0,001 0,004 0,008
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,005 0,007 0,007
Stranieri di SIENA 0,001 0,005 0,005
SALERNO 0,004 0,001 0,003
SANNIO di BENEVENTO 0,072
Note: Green cells represent weights greater than 0.1 while
green universities must have at least one green weight.
donor pool not being comparable to those treated. As for the results, we
would expect the synthetic control to systematically show lower volun-
tary leaves than the average treated units if individuals were reacting
differently based on the regulatory turn-over cap. Surprisingly, figure
10 show no such pattern with the synthetic control substantially above
the average treated one in 2010. In fact, this is in line with results from
difference in difference in table 9 where treated units showed on aver-
age lower voluntary leaves than universities with higher turn-over cap.
Apart from mandatory caution in interpreting results on just few post-
reform periods, these results point to the presence of some confounders
that we investigate in the next section.
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Figure 11: Synthetic control: associate p.
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Figure 12: Synthetic control: full p.
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3.5 Discussion
Difference in difference and synthetic control methods failed to capture a
seizable effect of the reform. Despite the reform appears to increase out-
flows from treated universities more than untreated ones, such increase
still leaves voluntary leaves more frequent on average among “sound”
institutions. Since these methods are both based on inter groups (treated
vs untreated) and time comparisons (pre vs post reform) they are more
robust than structural break models relying solely on time variation. We
do observe and measure an increase in voluntary leaves after 2009 but
this appear to be a trend common to the whole system with personnel
turn-over caps accounting only for little of its variability. On the top of
that, such caps appear to be inversely related to researchers dropouts
with lower rates occurring in institutions with tighter constraints (table
9). So far we pointed out statistical explanation for these puzzling re-
sults, such as variability in treatment sequences, small sample size and
few post-reform observations among others.
Nevertheless, were our measures correct how would we explain such
findings? We propose three tentative explanations based on the presence
of confounders. First, institutions with persistent personnel imbalances
may be of lower quality compared to those with sound budgets. For
this reason, their professors face worse outside opportunities and when
career expectations deteriorate they are still better off with their current
positions. This would explain why both difference in difference and syn-
thetic control reported lower voluntary leaves on average for this group.
Remarkably, this is true after controlling for university fixed effects in
section 3.4. The second explanation looks at time confounders rather
than longitudinal ones. With this respect figure 8 shows an increasing
trend in dropouts that started possibly in 2005, a time in which regula-
tion put no constraint on “good” institutions. Such patter is mirrored in
figure 6 where expenses for promotions and new hires drop after 2005.
Indeed, the legislator introduced a mandatory planning of university ac-
tivities11 in 2005. Such planning required universities to communicate,
classes, curricula, research goals as well as estimated labour and capital
investments to meet them. While this administrative regulation received
little attention at the time it might well have affected managerial practice
in universities beyond many other policies. Indeed, on-line procedures
made any personnel imbalance much more evident to both university
and ministerial boards so that the seven years old personnel expenses’
cap may practically have come into effect only after that. This would
explain why also sound institutions reduced promotions and new hires
in the pre reform period when they were totally unconstrained. Finally,
voluntary leaves may just be an administrative alternative to retirement.
Institutions may push senior members to quit their positions in exchange
of mid term temporary contracts covering the last years before actual re-
tirement. This would explain the positive coefficient for age in our micro
level regressions (table 8) and a distribution of age increasingly concen-
trated between 55 and 75 years for those who left in the post reform12.
11art. 1-ter law n. 43/2005
12Findings available upon request
3.6 Conclusions
We describe two contemporary trends in Italian universities. The first
one is a generalized reduction in new hires and promotions while the sec-
ond one is a 15% reduction in the number of professors over 2008-2013.
We use micro data to investigate the reasons why an increasing amount
of professors left academia. While aging and retirement are indeed a
driving factor, voluntary leaves are also responsible for a consistent part
of the trend. We argue that the increment in voluntary leaves may be a
consequence of budget constraints selectively imposed on universities in
2009. Under such claim, the new rules deteriorated the career prospects
of Italian professors so that, faced with lower expected earnings, some
decided to quit for foreign institutions or for the private sector. We use
three econometric models to identify whether constraints on personnel
expenses causally determined an increase in voluntary leaves from uni-
versities. We exploit the selectivity of the constraint and its time variation
to build a difference in difference estimator and a synthetic control eval-
uation. Difference in difference does indicate an increase in voluntary
leaves in universities more severely affected by the new rules. Never-
theless, both methods show that this group still present voluntary leaves
below that of less constrained institutions. While both descriptive and
parametric analysis (structural break) point to a clear increase in volun-
tary leaves along with the introduction of the new regulation, the evi-
dence of a selective impact on university with tighter constraints on per-
sonnel expenses remains weak. We highlight the possible shortcoming
of our methodologies along with some alternative explanations for the
results. With this respect, universities targeted by staff limits may be of
lower quality and their professors may face lower outside opportunities.
The deterioration of career prospects still result in current expected earn-
ing higher than any external alternative so that professors from these
institutions keep their positions more on average than colleagues else-
where. Secondly, there may be some anticipation effects due to the intro-
duction of other rules that possibly affected the two groups differently.
Finally, voluntary leaves may hide administrative retirements in which
individuals were grated short term contracts until their actual retirement
upon resigning.
Chapter 4
Voting Behavior, Coalitions
and Government Strength
through a Complex
Network Analysis
4.1 Introduction
A great deal of recent research has been devoted to explaining politi-
cal polarization in parliaments (Fiorina et al., 2008; Layman et al., 2006).
This literature has been dominated by models where party polarization
is either explained by the polarization of the electorate or through the
party and ideology of deputies. A new stem of literature has recently
adopted tools of Complex Network Science (Caldarelli, 2007; Newman,
2003) to investigate this issue, with a network representation being given
to committees and subcommittees who share the same members in the
US Congress (Porter et al., 2005), to members of the Congress who co-
sponsor bills (Fowler, 2006; Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010) or those who
place the same roll-call votes (Waugh et al., 2009a). We follow the lat-
ter approach so that deputies are represented as nodes within a network
where the number of shared roll-call votes determines the strength of
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their links. Similarly to Zhang et al. (2008) and Waugh et al. (2009b) we
make use of the network science concept of modularity in order to recon-
struct the community structure of the parliament (Newman and Girvan,
2004). We introduce a novel method to characterize the position of each
deputy in the community of reference, based on its contribution to the
modularity score, proposing a more intuitive interpretation compared
to that based on the spectral decomposition developed in Waugh et al.
(2009b) and in Porter et al. (2005). The method presented here can be eas-
ily generalized on a wider European scale, and replicated across a longer
time span or in industry-specific policies. In particular, the analysis can
be extended to deal with multiple interdependent networks (Buldyrev
et al., 2010) thanks to the interplay between senate and house of represen-
tatives or between national and european parliaments and take advan-
tage of recent development in different fields of complex science ranging
from critical infrastructures (Panzieri and Setola, 2008; Peerenboom et al.,
2001) to epidemics transmission (Zhao et al., 2014,?). Indeed, nowadays
political life of european countries is increasingly connected to, and in-
terconnected through, European Parliament decisions. Moreover, Euro-
pean parliamentary acts and documents are semantically classified and
organized in a EUROVOC thesaurus 1, that will make it possible to an-
alyze political positions across different and controlled thematic areas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the “Methods” section
we present the methodology used to investigate parliamentary polariza-
tion, party cohesion, community structure and their time evolution, in
the “Results” section the main findings related to the specific case of the
Italian Parliament are presented, while in the “Discussion” section we
draw our conclusions and sketch the lines of future research.
4.2 Methods
As the first step in our methodology we construct a graph where each
node represents one of the n deputies and edges are drawn every time
1http://eurovoc.europa.eu/drupal/
two deputies display the same voting behavior2. We then normalize
edges by the total number of votes in the reference period in order to
obtain a weighted graph where weights are 0 ≤ wij ≤ 1. Full weight is
given to two deputies i, j if they participated in all sessions and voted
exactly the same way in all of sessions. When a deputy quits the parlia-
ment, because of incompatibility, resignation etc., and his or her seat is
taken by a new person, we consider the two deputies as being just one
node3.
Initially, we look at the topological structure of parties in order to study
their cohesion over time. Completely ignoring any a priori knowledge of
party affiliation, we look at the communities arising directly from voting
behavior to see whether they match or not.
4.2.1 Analysis of party cohesion
Consider each party as a subgraph C of the graph G, with nC being the
number of deputies in the party. An intuitive way of measuring party
cohesion (i.e. the tendency of the party to vote as a single entity) is to
evaluate the intra-cluster density dint(C) defined as the ratio between the
total internal strength of the sub-graph C and the number of all possible
edges inside that cluster Fortunato (2010)
dint(C) =
∑
ij∈C wij
nc (nc − 1) /2 .
Similarly, we can define the inter-cluster density dext(C) as the ratio be-
tween the observed strength of edges running from the nodes of C to
the rest of the network and the maximum number of edges connecting
internal with external nodes:
dext(C) =
∑
i∈C,j /∈C wij
nc (n− nc) .
2i.e. both vote in favor, against or abstain from vote. No edges are drawn for absent
deputies.
3We check whether this transition leads to some votes in which none of the two deputies
had their chairs without finding any discontinuity.
A party stands out as a specific political group if dint(C) is appreciably
larger than the average link density d(G) =
∑
i,j wij/
n(n−1)
2 of the entire
network G and similarly we expect dext(C) to be appreciably smaller.
Searching for the best tradeoff between a large intra-cluster density and
a small inter-cluster one is indeed an implicit or explicit goal for most
algorithms used in community detection (Fortunato, 2010; Newman and
Girvan, 2004).
4.2.2 Community and core detection
Modularity optimization is a well-established method for detecting com-
munities (Newman and Girvan, 2004). The idea behind modularity is
that a random graph should not have a cluster structure so that com-
munities are revealed maximizing the difference between the density of
edges in a sub-graph and that expected if edges were connected at ran-
dom. Hence the modularity function of a weighted graph (Newman,
2004), where in our case nodes are deputies and edges represent the per-
centage of votes that two of them have in common, is given by:
Q =
1
2W
∑
i,j
(
Aij − sisj
2W
)
δ (Ci, Cj)
where Aij gives the fraction of similar votes deputies i and j share in
common (Aij = wij), W is the total weight in the network, δ (Ci, Cj) is a
delta function that yields one if deputies i and j are in the same commu-
nity (Ci = Cj) and 0 otherwise, and si, sj represent the strength of node
i and j respectively.
In the general case of modern democracies the typical result of the mod-
ularity optimization should be the splitting of the graph into two com-
munities that reproduces the government coalition and the opposition.
Moreover each node in its community usually doesn’t have the same im-
portance for its stability. Indeed, the removal of a node in the community
core should affect the partition much more than the deletion of a bound-
ary node. In other terms, some deputies display such a high degree of
Figure 13: Cluster Densities
Members of a party show cohesion if the links connecting them are stronger
than the ties with other deputies. We capture the former by the intra-cluster
density dint(C) and the latter by the inter-cluster density dext(C). The
party shows high cohesion when the two lie considerably higher and lower
respectively copared to the average link density of the whole parliament
d(C).
internal connections so that they can be identified as the bulk of the coali-
tion. As we proceed toward the boundary, deputies display increasing
connections to the opposite community.
In order to investigate this structure, we exploit the properties of the
modularity function following a new procedure introduced in De Leo
et al. (2013). By definition, if the modularity associated with a network
has been optimized, every perturbation of the partition leads to a nega-
tive variation of the modularity dQ < 0.
We compute the effect on the modularity associated with the shift of a
deputy from one community to another and we plot the corresponding
dQ′s distribution in order to check the coreness of each deputy and his
party. In case of three or more communities dQwas originally developed
in De Leo et al. (2013) to report the minimum variation in modularity,
i.e. modularity was compared against a setup in which each node was
moved, one per time, to its closest community. Here we rather consider
movements to the farthest community in order to avoid abrupt shifts in
the distribution of dQ due to the rise of small temporary (third) com-
munities. Finally the histogram of the dQ′s will highlight the different
groups that make up the coalition and will show different sub distribu-
tions along the support interval of dQ.
4.2.3 Measures of Polarization, Cohesion and Stability
Dealing with roll-call vote’s networks as a whole, standard approaches
(Moody and Mucha, 2013; Waugh et al., 2009a,b) have adopted the mod-
ularity score as a measure for party polarization. However, our method-
ology gives us the possibility to consider the overall voting behavior on a
much finer scale, considering the contribution of every single deputy. In
line with this, we have decided to measure the polarization as an average
decrease in the modularity score consequent to the substitution of two
opposite deputies; the larger the decrease in the modularity score, the
larger the current contraposition between the two coalitions becomes. So
we define the polarization as the sum of the median of the monthly dQ
distributions of the two communities4.
When we focus on features of only one community, we still need
to account for the community structure of the whole graph. Think for
instance of two time frames in which the members of the ruling coali-
tion vote exactly the same while the opposition voted 1/2 and 1/4 of the
time with the government. Then the government dQ distribution would
present more extreme values in the latter case, determining a shift to-
wards more negative values of the mass of the entire distribution, despite
the cohesion of the government per se not changing at all. Therefore any
measure of cohesion should be robust to changes in the location of the
distribution. A suitable one is represented by the interquartile difference
of the dQ′s distribution that we will employ as our standard definition
for the party/coalition cohesiveness.
In addition to polarization and cohesion, the stability of the govern-
ment is directly affected by the number of its loyal deputies; in order
for laws to be passed, half plus one of the total number of deputies are
needed in the Chamber of Deputies. So as a rough rule of thumb, we can
consider a government that keeps up to half plus one deputies on his
side to still be safe. This measure accounts for the stability of the govern-
ment comunity in the shape of a safety zone that divides the last critical
deputy able to break down the majority from the dQ = 0 postion before
the oppositon community region.
4.3 Results
As a concrete case we analyze the network of deputies in the newly
elected Italian Chamber of Deputies (2013). We collect information on
the 630 deputies and their voting behavior from the government open
data SPARQL endpoint5. The reader may refer to table 12 for an out-
line of the main Italian parties mentioned in this paper. The available
data cover parliamentary votes from April 2013, when the new parlia-
4The median has been preferred to the mean as a measure of location, because the dis-
tributions of both communities are strongly (negatively) skewed.
5http://dati.camera.it/sparql
Figure 14: Community Structure of the Italian Parliament
The vertical dashed line separates the two main coalitions/communities
(Government/Opposition). Each coalition comprises different parties
corresponding to different colors. The quantity ’dQ’ is associated to the
coreness of each deputy/party. The distributions are obtained computing the
coreness of each deputy and then aggregating them in the form of a stacked
istogram. The more the distance of the bars from the vertical dashed line,
the more the deputies/parties are at the core of their coalition. Notice how
the main parties tend to segregate in clusterd distributions with different
positions in the ’dQ’ axes.
ment was appointed, to the end of December 2013. Despite being quite a
short period of time, the dataset covers 2820 parliamentary votes, which
implies more than 1,5 million individual votes in our time span. Impor-
tantly, the Italian government has made semantic data following W3C
standards available, which translates into fast and precise data manipu-
lation through computer based queries. We refer to this source of data
for the profiles of deputies and the classification of votes, while data on
voting behavior of single deputies was taken directly from institutional
web sites6.
Figure 13 represents the evolution of density measures over time for each
party in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. While the structures of the
M5S, PD, SEL and LNA parties are recognizable within the graph, the
other groups present inter- and intra-cluster densities that are very close
to each other, or at times even overlapping. This means that at a certain
point their votes proportionally coincide to a greater degree with other
groups than with their own members. The plots marked with a colored
background report the splitting of two political groups, when the PDL
breaks up into the NCD and the FI in November 2013 and the PI exits
from the SCPI in December 2013. The inter-cluster density, represented
in green, is clearly higher for groups who support the government (PD,
PDL and SCPI). Theoretically these groups should vote in compliance
with the majority’s prescriptions, thereby showing a similar voting be-
havior. Once we take into account the average monthly levels of edge
density d(G) the topological structure of parties becomes very similar to
the rest of the graph. As such, parties may not be the most appropriate
representation of voting structure, thus leading us to consider the behav-
ioral identification of political groups through the modularity function.
Once applied to the graph of deputies, the modularity optimization usu-
ally splits the graph into two communities that almost exactly match the
government coalition and the opposition as shown in figure 14 where the
vertical dashed line separates the two coalitions.
Afterword we compute the effect on the modularity associated with the
removal of a deputy from his community computing the corresponding
6http://documenti.camera.it/votazioni/votazionitutte/FormVotazioni.Asp?Legislatura=XVII
Table 12: Outline of the main Italian parties
Party Coalition %∗ Notes
Partito Democratico (PD) Gov 46, 5% Main center-left party, historically lead by Prodi
Il Popolo della Liberta` (PDL) Gov/Opp 15, 2% Main conservative party, lead by Berlusconi
Forza Italia (FI) Opp 10, 6% From PDL split, founded and lead by Berlusconi
Nuovo Centro Destra (NCD) Gov 4, 6% From PDL split, lead by Alfano
Scelta Civica (SC) Gov 7, 3% Lead by Monti, PM for one year after 2011 crisis
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) Opp 16, 3% Lead by comedian Grillo, form of direct democracy
Sinistra-Ecologia-Liberta` (SEL) Opp 5, 6% Left party, former ally of PD
Lega Nord (LN) Opp 3, 2% Autonomist party of Northern Italy, former ally of PDL
∗ Shares updated to may 2014, smaller parties omitted.
dQ′s and the result is also shown in figure 14.
The histogram shows the dQ′s distribution of the government’s coalition
on the left side of the dashed line and that of the opposition on the right,
with alle the dQ associated to different parties in different colors.
Indeed, the core of the coalition appears to be made up by a relatively
higher share of deputies from the center-left party PD while relatively
more deputies from the center-right party PDL appear to be at the pe-
riphery as we move to the right. This provides an interesting insight on
the rather different roles played by the two main Italian parties joined by
a coalition pact, namely the PD and the PDL, with the latter ultimately
quitting the government in mid November 2013. As for the opposition,
note that the support of dQ is far more dispersed with each group taking
on a limited range of values in the distribution. This is not surprising in
that the opposition is not a coalition per se but rather a set of groups that
might vote with the ruling coalition depending on the subject at hand.
In particular, deputies from the M5S make up the core of the opposition
with a higher magnitude of dQ, which also holds true when compared
to the core of the government coalition. This may be due to a relatively
inflexible opposition to the government or in equal measure to the fact
that it is the largest group in the opposition community. On the other
hand, the SEL and the LNA are progressively closer to the border of the
community, which may be reasonable if we consider that these groups
used to be allies of two parties in the government coalition, namely the
PD and the PDL respectively.
4.3.1 Time evolution of the community structure
The same analysis has been carried out over time, dividing votes per
month, building up the corresponding graphs and performing the com-
munity and core analysis on each monthly network.
In figure 15 the two main communities present increasingly extreme
values of dQ over time, which in turns provides evidence of increasing
polarization in the parliament, as it is measured as the sum of the median
of the monthly distributions (see Methods section).
This may reflect the change in the political position of M5S which moved
from declared openness to the government on a single bill basis Il Fatto
Quotidiano (2013) to a very sharp contrast as events unfolded. Two con-
troversial bills that occupied a large fraction of the assembly’s sessions
over summer 2013 7 and the worsening of the political climate that led
to the repeated demand for resignation of government ministers in the
following autumn ANSA (a), might have driven the political debate to-
wards increasingly polarized configurations as it is evident in figure 15
also on a monthly level of aggregation.
In this respect, December noticeably stands out, with a reduction in the
extreme values of dQ for the opposition. This is actually driven by the
fragmentation of the PDL, which witnessed its deputies loyal to the leader
Silvio Berlusconi, withdraw their support of the government Bloomberg
(2013) and start to vote with the opposition to the point of being identi-
fied as part of it at least in its border. The figure 15 illustrates also the co-
hesion, or rather its flip side: the heterogeneity of deputies within a sin-
gle community, along with the government stability represented through
a green safety zone. This area spans values of dQ smaller (in absolute
value) than the monthly critical value dQcritical. The latter corresponds
to the level of coreness of the deputy which would pose the government
in numeric inferiority, were he leaving the coalition. In the specific case
of the Italian Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies has 630 representa-
tives and the critical value will correspond to the dQ relative to the 316th
7the shut down of an old iron factory and a bill ANSA (b) containing economic reforms
to tackle the crisis culminated with M5S’s deputies blocking the assembly and then leaving
it once the measures were eventually passed
deputy.
With fixed levels of polarization and cohesion, a greater absolute value
of dQcritical would widen the safety zone in that a relatively more loyal
deputy would have to leave the government coalition in order to make it
facing the risk of having its laws rejected. Having investigated the pecu-
liar structure of the government coalition, we focus on a political party
that may be partly responsible for the variability of the coalitions topol-
ogy over time. Indeed the PDL, after a long debate regarding whether to
support the government or not, eventually split into two different par-
ties. After the split in mid November, deputies from the FI moved into
the opposition community. However, surprisingly, those who left moved
from the core of the government to relatively core positions in the oppo-
sition, as reported in figure 16.
This dynamic may somehow explain the peculiar drop of the polariza-
tion observed in December in figure 15, as the FI group switched voting
behavior to such a degree as to be recognized as part of the opposition,
simultaneously reducing the contraposition between the two communi-
ties.
4.4 Discussion
The study of the consensus dynamics in modern parliamentary democ-
racies is of great importance for the validation by citizens of the perfor-
mance of their representatives. These dynamics are often hidden by com-
plicated voting procedures that prevent the easy identification of these
civil representatives. We need new ways to look at the details of the polit-
ical activities, which go beyond the standard statistical indicators, ways
that are able to reveal the dynamics of the general organization of the
government, its opposition and even their internal structures, in a for-
mat that is intelligible to non-expert users. In this study we introduced
a novel procedure to map parliamentary voting trends onto a network
structure in which the nodes are the deputies and the edge weights are
the strength of their relations. These weights, month by month, quan-
Figure 15: Community structure over time
The evolution of community structure over time provides a way to track the
cohesion of the government and the overall polarization in the parliament.
The empyrical analog of the cohesion is represented here by the interquantile
difference of the dQ distribution, where higher cohesion occurs for lower
values of the interquantile. On the other hand higher parliament polarization
is captured by the distance between the two medians. Finally the safety zone
that divides the last critical deputy able to break down the majority from the
vertical dashed line (dQ = 0) is represented in green.
Figure 16: Community structure during parties split up
The position of single deputies within communities provides insights on
what happens when a party splits up. In this particular case the PDL party
in mid November 2013 splits into two different parties ’Forza Italia’ and
’Nuovo Centrodestra’. Interestigly, nodes at the core of the government
coalition become core in the opposition one when the split up occurs. This is
evidence of political voting being driven by coalitions’ affilitions rather than
the policy content of each roll call vote.
titatively measure the degree of closeness between couples of deputies
as the number of votes they shared in a specific time frame. Once this
network has been built up, using Community Detection techniques bor-
rowed from Complex Network Science, it is possible to reconstruct the
main coalitions, the government and the opposition from the bottom up;
through a ‘Core Detection’ analysis it is also possible to uncover the in-
ternal structure of these aggregations. Using the leverage of later analy-
ses we were able to quantitatively detect the position of each party, the
strength and consistency in its coalition and the level of polarization be-
tween government and opposition.
Furthermore, the Open Data movements around the world are push-
ing public administrations to provide free and open access to massive
amounts of data, which can be used by citizens and companies as a start-
ing point for the detailed analysis of public policies. In this study, we
relied on a recent service introduced by the Italian parliament that al-
lows the automated extraction of certified information about the votes
of the Chamber of Deputies. Through this service we have been able to
perform a thorough analysis of the dynamics of the Italian parliamen-
tary factions over nearly a year of legislation, using the aforementioned
methodology.
These methods open up new possibilities of bringing citizens closer to
their representatives, thereby establishing the foundations for a more
transparent democracy.
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